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INTRODUCTION

The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the
Estates of Deceased Persons' is an exceptionally complex document
with the avowed purpose of radically altering the choice of law rules
in the succession field that have traditionally guided all common law
jurisdictions 2 as well as many civil law regimes. 3 To date, the conflicts revolution that has engulfed other fields of law such as contracts
and torts4 has barely intruded into the realm of property and succession law. 5 In large part, this has been attributable to the nearly absolute adherence of judges and legislators6 to the relatively simple,
straightforward standards that have held sway for centuries.7 The
ambivalence of conflicts theorists has also been an important factor.
For example, while several have sought to depart from the complete

inflexibility of the present situs rule with respect to real property, 8
they have at the same time recognized that considerations such as
efficiency, simplicity, and predictability are essential when dealing
with the transfer of title to property and that a state must be able to
exercise some control over the determination of who shall be entitled
to inherit land within its borders, on what terms, and subject to what
1. See Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons,
Aug. 1, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 150, reprinted in 2 Proceedings of the Sixteenth Session of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law 515 (1990) [hereinafter Convention].
2. See infra text accompanying notes 14 & 18-20.
3. See infra notes 21-22.
4. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice of Law, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1585
(1985); Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflicts of Law: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 Am. J.
Comp. L. 1 (1984); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From
Beale to Cavers, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 377 (1966).
5. See, e.g., Robert Alden, Note, Modernizing the Situs Rule for Real Property Conflicts, 65
Tex. L. Rev. 585 (1987). See also Robert A. Sedler, Across State Lines 75-83 (1989); Eugene
F. Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws 713 (Lawyer's ed. 1982).
6. See Scoles & Hay, supra note 5, at 715.
7. The traditional choice of law rule is the law of the situs for real property and the law of
the domicile for personal property. See infra text accompanying notes 14-15.
8. See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 412-48 (3d ed.
1986).
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restrictions.9 The Convention sets its own course-it upends the prevailing system, but in doing so, totally disregards the interests of both
the situs and domicile states. Instead, it proposes a novel, untested
potporri of choice of law rules to be applied worldwide.
This Article will first examine critically the general operation of the
Convention. An evaluation will be made of the arguments in support
of the proposal to eliminate the situs rule for real property and the
consequences from both a choice of law and wealth transfer perspective which are likely to flow from the substitution of new and arbitrary rules. The Article will then undertake a similar review of the
Convention's departure from the domicile standard with respect to
personal property.
Following this consideration, the Article will evaluate the Convention's likely impact on estate planning and the efforts of mobile individuals and those with multijurisdictional estates to predetermine the
rules by which their wealth will be disposed. The Article then proceeds to examine other fundamental issues of choice of law that are
raised by the Convention and its quixotic quest for uniformity and a
unitary choice of law rule, specifically: proof of foreign law, debate
among scholars as to the proper approach in identification and resolution of conflicts of law, renvoi, incidental questions, what is a "conflict," and the viability and scope of the public policy exception to
choice of law rules.
With these issues in mind, the Article considers a technical solution
to the problems raised by the Convention. It then proceeds to discuss
the broader issue of choice of law uniformity raised by the Convention. The conclusion is reached that this primary goal of the Convention is an elusive and unattainable one. Furthermore, in the futile
attempt to achieve this objective, a set of conflicts rules is being proposed which is as rigid as the existing ones, but do not have their
predictability.
II.
A.

CHOICE OF LAW CONSIDERATIONS

The General Operation of the Convention

The Convention generally sets forth certain uniform rules determining which country's law governs matters of intestate
and testate
9. See, eg., Hill, supra note 4, at 1628; Moffatt Hancock, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign
Laws and Judgments in Real Property Litigation: The Supreme Court and the Land Taboo,
reprinted in Studies in Modern Choice-of-Law: Torts, Insurance, Land Titles 327, 332-33
(1984); Brainerd Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. Chli. L Rev.
620, 658 (1954).
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succession.' 0 It makes at least four major changes in the choice of law
principles observed by most, if not all, states'" with respect to transfers of wealth at death. First, the Convention eliminates reference to
the law of the situs with respect to real property. Second, the determinative law of personal property is changed from that of the decedent's domicile at death to that of the decedent's nationality and
habitual residence, standards which no American states currently
employ.12 These same standards are also applied to real property.
Third, the Convention forecloses certain voluntary choice of law
options that are presently available in an estate planning context.
Fourth, the Convention applies separate choice of law rules for multistate estates, as opposed to multinational estates. As a result, attorneys must carefully evaluate whether to apply the current choice of
law rules or those under the Convention for their clients with international contacts.
A careful reading of the Convention and the Explanatory Report
by the Reporter for the Draft Convention, Professor D.W.M.
Waters,13 reveals technical flaws and unsettled issues. For now, however, the process of review should focus on the broader question of
whether the United States should support the major changes wrought
by the Convention. These key changes and their overall implications
for choice of law are considered below.
10. See Convention, supra note 1. This Article does not focus directly on that segment of
the Convention that relates to "succession agreements," an arrangement far more common in
civil law systems.
11. The references to "state" throughout this Article relate to the American states, although
the Convention itself uses the term to refer to sovereign countries. Misunderstandings have
previously been engendered in conflicts analysis, especially between European and American
commentators as a result of the failure to clarify the meaning of the term. See Henna H. Kay,
A Defense of Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis, 215 Recueil des Cours 19, 90-92 (III
1989).
12. In addition, there are three even more amorphous subsidiary standards that apply in
certain circumstances-the state with which the decedent had the "closest connection," the
state with which the decedent was "more closely connected," and the state of which the
decedent was "resident" (as opposed to "habitually resident"). This heirarchy of choice of law
rules has been crticized as creating "complexity and uncertainty." See Peter M. North,
Reform But Not Resolution: General Course on Private International Law, 220 Recueil des
Cours 19, 281 (I 1990). Professor North concludes that, "What is far from clear is that there is
real evidence, in the common law world at least, that the international problems are so
significant that the need for international harmonization outweighs the defects of the
Convention as a compromise measure and a complex one at that. The case for the Convention
does not seem to have been made out." Id. at 282 (footnote omitted).
13. See Donovan W. M. Waters, Explanatory Report (May 1989), reprinted in 2
Proceedings of the Sixteenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law
525 (1990) [hereinafter Report].
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The Elimination of the Situs Rule for Real Property
The traditional Anglo-American rule that governs succession to

real property has been that the law of the situs controls.1 4 On the
other hand, the law of the domicile has traditionally controlled the
succession to personal property.15 Although some academics and theorists have urged adoption of a unitary rule for real and personal
property, 16 the adherence to the situs rule for real property disposed
of by will or intestate succession has remained virtually monolithic in
this country.17 In addition to the United States, the component juris-

dictions of the United Kingdom,1 8 as well as various other Commonwealth countries, such as Australia 19 and the Canadian provinces,2 °
France, 21 and a number of other countries apply the situs rule to real
property. 22 Admittedly, other nations apply a unitary choice of law
14. Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws § 239 (1971); Joseph Story,
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws § 424, at 358; § 463, at 390 (1834). See also Clarke v.
Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900) ("It is a doctrine firmly established that the law of a State in which
the land is situated controls and governs ... its passage in case of intestacy."); McGoon v.
Scales, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 23, 27 (1869) ("It is a principle too firmly established to admit of
dispute at this day, that to the law of the State in which the land is situated must we look for
the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, for the effect and construction of
conveyances."). For a consideration of the origins of the situs rule, see Alden, supra note 5, at
587-91.
15. Restatement (Second), supra note 14, § 263.
16. See, eg., Scoles & Hay, supra note 5, at 713-14.
17. Under the Uniform Probate Code, § 2-703, 8 U.L.A. 1 (1991 Supp.) [hereinafter UPC],
the testator may designate a different law for various purposes, but absent a designation or in
cases other than those involving the spouse's elective share, UPC states generally adhere to the
situs rule. See, eg., In re Estate of Swanson, 397 So. 2d 465,466 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1981);, In
re Estate of W-imbush, 587 P.2d 796, 799 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978). See also In Re Estate of
Clark, 772 P.2d 297, 298 (Mont. 1989). See also the recently enacted provisions of the
Louisana Civil Code relating to conflict of laws. La. Civ. Code, art. 33 (West 1991).
18. See, e.g., Royal Bank of Canada, Ltd. v. Krogh, [1986] 1 All ER 611. See generally
Lawrence Collins, Dicey & Morris on the Conflict of Laws 1005 (1lth ed. 1987 & 1990 Supp.).
19. See generally Edward I. Sykes & Michael C. Pryles, Australian Private International
Law 717-23 (2d ed. 1987).
20. See, eg., Moisan v. Morency, [1983] C.S. 481(Que.) (the law of Florida controls the
disposition of a Florida condominium owned by a domiciliary of Quebec, a province that
generally follows the French model). See also Chochinov v. Davis, [1980] 113 D.L.R.3d 715
(Man.) (reaching the same result under the English common law model).
21. See C. civ., art. 3, para. 2; Judgment of June 4, 1941, Cass. Civ., [1944] S. Jur. I 133;
Judgment of Jan. 29, 1948, Trib. Civ. Seine, [1949] Rev. Crit. de Droit Int. Priv. 521. See
generally Yvon Loussouarn & Pierre Bourel, Droit International Prive 664 (3d ed. 1988).
22. For example, in an important development, the European Community has recently
endorsed application of the situs rule in a number of contexts involving real property. See
infra text accompanying note 76. Historically, a number of civil jurisdictions have recognized
a scission in choice of law and have applied the situs rule to immovables. These include
Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Hungary, and Romania. See also Montevideo Convention on
the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 U.N.T.S. 19, arts. 44 & 45
(abandoning scission and applying the law of the situs to movables, as well as immovables);
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rule, although they often observe an exception regarding real property
located in a foreign country.2 3 Contrary to the contention of the
American representative to the Hague Conference, Professor Eugene
Scoles,24 neither the UPC nor New York law endorses a general unitary rule. The UPC does not address the matter, except with respect
to section 2-602 pertaining to governing law clauses, and section 2201, relating to the spouse's elective share rights. Indeed, states that
have adopted the UPC continue to apply the common law situs rule. 25
As for New York, Estates Powers and Trusts Law section 3-5. l(b)(1)
expressly states that the law of the situs controls with respect to issues
concerning the testamentary disposition of real property.26
Strong academic arguments have been made in opposition to a rigidly applied situs rule. All such arguments, however, have recognized
the continuing, legitimate interests of the situs and the fact that its
Civil Code for the Federal Dist. and Territories, Prelim. Provs. art. 14, reprinted in Mexican
Civil Code (Michael W. Gordon trans. 1980). See generally Martin Wolff, Private
International Law 567-568 (2d ed. 1950 & photo reprint 1977). The Hague Conference itself
has endorsed the situs rule in the past. See, e.g., Convention Relating to Conflicts of Laws
with Regard to the Effects of Marriage on the Rights and Duties of Spouses and with Regard
to their Estates, JuL 11, 1905, 199 Consol. T. S. 17 (1980), art. 7 (adopted by a number of
countries).
23. See Jan Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht 371-72 (1990) (discussing Germany's
approach); Kurt Siehr, Das Internationale Erbrecht nach dem Gesetz Zur Neuregelung des
IPR, 1987 IPRAX 4. Pursuant to certain bilateral treaties, Germany has adopted the situs
rule for real property. See, e.g., the German-Turkish Consular Treaty of 1929, May 3, 1930,
RGBI 1930 II 748. See also Ulrich Drobnig, American-German Private International Law
151-152 (2d ed. 1972). See generally Introductory Act of the German Civil Code and Marriage
Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, art. 28 (Ian S. Forrester ed. 1976) (former article 28
deferred to the law of the situs of property if that country applied local law. Even though the
Introductory Law was recently amended, article 28 in essence was retained). See Siehr, supra
at 5. See generally Heinrich Schinfelder, Einf'ihrungsgesetz zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuche
(EGBGB) Deutsche Gesetze (1991); Rainer Gildeggen and Joehen Langkeit, The New
Conflict of Laws Code Provisions of the Federal Republic of Germany: Introductory
Comment and Translation, 17 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 229 (1986). For an impressive
consideration of the German situation, as well as the many other deviations from a unitary
rule in favor of the situs law in matters of inheritance, see 4 Ernst Rabel, The Conflict of Laws:
A Comparative Study 251-57 (1958).
24. Eugene Scoles, Comments on Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession
to the Estates of Deceased Persons, Memorandum to John Wallace, Director, Probate and
Trust Division, Section RPPT, ABA (Sept. 19, 1989).
25. See, e.g., In re Estate of Swanson, 397 So. 2d 465, 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). In
Swanson, the court of appeals expressly held that the UPC did not set forth choice of law rules
as to substantive issues. Accordingly, the established situs common law rule, as reflected in the
Supreme Court decision in Clarke v. Clarke and the Restatement (Second), supra note 14,
remain the law.
26. N.Y. Estates, Powers and Trusts Law § 3-5.1(b)(1) (Consol. 1991). The New York
provision, § 5-1.1(a)(8), cited by Professor Scoles, relates to the separate issue of whether the
computation of the spouse's elective share will be based on all property, wherever situated,
including foreign real estate.
HeinOnline -- 32 Va. J. Int'l L. 88 1991-1992

1991]

DECEDENTS' ESTATES

interests must be taken into account. 27 The Convention would
entirely disregard the situs' interests.
Such disregard could have some very harmful economic, political,
and social effects and is entirely antithetical to any rational conflicts
resolution process. For example, if an Arab investor in Texas real
estate dies, Texas has a very real interest in assuring that its land will
not be unduly fractionalized, burdened for generations, or distributed
in a manner that favors one gender, based on Islamic law. Furthermore, it has an interest in assuring that the attorneys, the local probate judge, the title insurers, and representatives of subsequent
purchasers are not burdened with having to master the intricacies of
this religious inheritance law. 28 The state also has an interest in protecting local creditors and mortgagees, who otherwise may be placed
in an untenable situation under a foreign law2 9 that may be far more
27. Virtually every commentator who has criticized a strict situs rule has, nevertheless,
recognized the vital interest a state has in such matters as the title system and restrictions on
alienation. See, eg., Sedler, supra note 5, at 87; David F. Cavers, The Choice of Law Process,
197 & n.31 (1965); Leflar, infra note 46, at 474-75; Brainerd Currie, Full Faith and Credit to
Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. Chi. I Rev. 620, 642 (1954); Hancock, supra note 9, at 329;
Richman & Reynolds, infra note 91, at 219-20; Scoles & Hay, supra note 5, at 714, 768, 770.
Of course there are other commentators who are more favorably inclined to a situs rule as a
result of general inclination towards definite rules. See, eg., Ely, infra note 70, at 213;
Brilmayer, infra note 70, at 396-97; Willis Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 Corn.
L. Rev. 315, 331-34 (1972); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 223-43 (1971); Hill,
supra note 4, at 1628-30; Albert Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum, 18 Okla. L
Rev. 340, 342 (1965).
28. In this regard, a determination would have to be made before the Convention was
applied as to the branch of Islam to which the investor belonged. Suppose he was a Sunni.
There are four schools of Sunni jurisprudence alone. See, eg., Herbert Liebesny, The Law of
the Near and Middle East 21-22 (1974); Asaf A.A. Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law 3335 (4th ed. 1974). See also J.N.D. Anderson, Recent Reforms in the Islamic Law of
Inheritance, 14 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 349 (1965). Islamic law imposes major restrictions on
testamentary freedom, typically permitting only one-third of the estate to pass by will. The
other two-thirds are distributed pursuant to a highly complex and gender-biased law of
intestate succession that tends to fractionalize the estate. See Liebesny, supra at 174-82. In
response to the dissatisfaction with limits on testamentary freedom and fractionalization,
various institutions such as the Wakf have developed. This Islamic trust avoids the problems
mentioned, but has its own drawbacks. In particular, it is not limited by any period of
perpetuities. Largely because of this, it has been reformed or prohibited in several countries,
although it is still valid in others. See id. at 226-27.
29. Apparently, the Convention is not intended uniformly to govern creditors' rights, which
are deemed a matter of estate administration and not succession. See Report, supra note 13, cl.
76, at 565. Article 7(2) specifies the particular areas covered by the Convention. See infra note
57. Creditors' rights are not included. Article 1(2) specifies particular areas not subject to the
Convention. Again, creditors' rights are not included. Thus, the matter of creditors' rights in
fact falls within a "gray" area. In this regard, article 7(3) permits a forum to apply the
Convention to matters in addition to those explicitly covered. Moreover, the Convention's
application to matters of "succession" is defined by each forum independently. See infra note
56. See Report, supra note 13, cls. 17 & 18, at 533; cl. 24 at 535; cl. 74 at 563. It is noteworthy
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concerned with respecting the rights of distant relatives or religious
institutions in the Texas land than it is in protecting the rights of
those who lend money. 0
Despite Professor Scoles' suggestion that great confusion has
resulted from the "scission" in the treatment of real property and personal property, 31 he presents no hard evidence or statistics. More
importantly, there is no rationale offered for the "unitarist" approach
or why a unitarist approach must entirely ignore the interests of the
situs or other interested jurisdictions. 32 A Convention that overturns
fundamental and historical33 choice of law rules should not be ratified
without persuasive evidence that the current regime produces irrathat in many civil law countries "succession" encompasses matters of estate administration.
Thus, depending on the forum, creditors rights might be implicated. Then, if the applicable
law under the Convention so provided, the rights of creditors might be overridden. Curiously,
the forum is able to expand the scope of the Convention, but not necessarily to determine the
substance of the law once it does so. That law is prescribed by the mandatory choice of law
provisions of articles 3, 4, 5, and 6.
30. Difficulties might also be encountered if the property had been left to a person of a
particular racial background who was prohibited from owning such property under the foreign
law, although this violated fundamental principles of federal and state constitutional law. It
is far from clear that a public policy exception justifying nonapplication of the Convention's
choice of law could be claimed by the American state in which the property was situated. For
a discussion of the public policy exception, as well as the possible role of the Supreme Court,
see infra text accompanying note 262. Of course, the Convention could be challenged on
federal constitutional grounds as, for example, denying equal protection of the law. However,
the very fact that discriminatory rules might be countenanced under the Convention
demonstrates the serious drawback of adoption of rigid, valueless choice of law standards that
fail to take account of fundamental forum values. The enormous policy differences that exist
among countries on substantive succession issues will very likely lead to the routine invocation
of the public policy exception and the undermining of the Convention's objective of uniformity
in choice of law.
31. See supra note 6. See also supra note 12 (comments of Professor North).
32. The best the Report does is state that "the arguable distinction between movables and
immovables, and the ease with which one can be converted into the other, make scission today
much less defensible than in the days of land and interest on bonds." The Report correctly
notes that though "[mI]any people, including authors on the conflict of laws, regard the
connecting factor of situs in the case of immovables to be practically inevitable.., it has been
widely recognized in the scissionist jurisdictions that the rule of the situs is open to serious
criticism." See Report, supra note 13, el. 24 at 535. Still, this does not support ignoring the
situs state's interests. Furthermore, the fact that certain conversions from real to personal
property are possible, and that characterization problems can arise, hardly argues for the rigid,
objective rules of the Convention.
33. The situs rule in the United States is traceable back at least to Joseph Story and his
territorial theory of law. See Story, supra note 14, §§ 1-16, at 1-18; § 428, at 361; § 463, at
390. Justice Story relied largely on English common law and expressly rejected the conflicting
views of certain European scholars. For a further consideration of the historical roots of the
situs rule, see Hancock, supra note 9; Alden, supra note 5, at 587-91. In its recent decision in
Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S.Ct. 2105 (1990), involving the related area of personal
jurisdiction, the Justices of the Supreme Court appeared to recognize the importance of
tradition and continuity of practice in rulemaking.
HeinOnline -- 32 Va. J. Int'l L. 90 1991-1992

1991]

DECEDENTS' ESTATES

tional or unjust outcomes either theoretically or practically, and that
ratification of the Convention will rectify the situation.'
If the Convention applied to the succession to real estate, a thorough evaluation of the law of a foreign country might have to be made
before title could pass reliably.35 Even before that evaluation could be
made, one would have to ascertain which country's law applied.
Since probate initially involves notice to the persons entitled to contest or to take by intestate succession,36 whether there is a will or not,
a determination would have to be made in the case of every estate as
to whether there are any international conflicts. If there were, the
identity of the heirs and next-of-kin would very possibly change,
thereby altering the persons who must be notified. Furthermore, the
inquiry would presumably have to be made by the county clerk or
local attorney for the decedent's estate. In many cases they would
have neither the expertise nor access to resources to delve into foreign
37
law.
These persons would initially confront the Convention's intricate
rules for ascertaining which country's law governs. First, a determination regarding the country of which the decedent was a habitual
resident at the time of his death would have to be made. Second, they
would have to consider whether the decedent was also a national of
that country at the time of death. If so, the law of that jurisdiction
would govern. 38 Third, if the person did not die with a coincidence of
habitual residence and nationality at death, then a further determination would have to be made whether the decedent had been a resident
of his country of habitual residence at death for at least the five years
preceding his death, in which case, that country's law would govern.3 9
34. See infra text accompanying notes 37-48.
35. Professor Waters recognizes that problems could be created for title companies, which
would face the far more difficult task of ascertaining the validity of a particular disposition
under a foreign law rather than under local law. Report, supra note 13, cI. 74, at 563.
36. See 3 William J. Bowe & Douglas H. Parker, Page on Wills § 26.11 (3d ed. 1964 &
Supp. 1991).
37. The implications for lawyers practicing in this field could be substantial and might well
involve a significant increase in probate expense as well as a redistribution of wealth from local,
nonspecialized lawyers to larger, more sophisticated "international" practitioners. This might
prove appealing to certain estate planners who have recently lost considerable business due to
changes in the tax law, family wealth patterns, and the competition from non-lawyers. See,
e.g., John H. Langbein, Taking a Look at the Pluses and Minuses of the Practice, Tr. & Est.,
Dec. 1989, at 10. See also Jeffrey Pennell, Introduction: Whither Estate Planning, 24 Idaho L
Rev. 339 (1987); J. Thomas Eubank, A.D. 2001: Estate Planning in the Future, 21 Inst. on Est.
Plan 2000 (1986). Cf. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the
Law of Succession, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1108 (1984).
38. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3().
39. Id. at arts. 3(2) and 19(7). The question as to when a person gains or loses an habitual
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Fourth, if the decedent had not been a resident for the requisite
period, then with the exception of certain limited situations, reference
would have to be made to the law of his nationality.'
With respect to this last standard, many countries either do not
permit voluntary relinquishment of citizenship or nationality or place
severe restrictions on such relinquishment. 41 An individual with
international contacts, whom the Convention is ostensibly intended to
assist,42 might well be found to have any number of nationalities. Sigresidence, as opposed to just a residence, borders on the metaphysical. It has provoked a fair
amount of comment in the United Kingdom, with a great deal of disagreement. See, e.g., infra
note 94. Obviously, the distinction is important because mere residence at death will not
invoke the Convention's habitual residence choice of law rule. On the other hand, if a person
was a mere resident for five years prior to.death, but was then deemed an habitual resident on
the date of his death, the Convention would require application of the law of the habitual
residence. See also infra text accompanying notes 105-107.
40. See Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3(3).
41. See, e.g., Code de ]a Nationalit6 art., 87 to 97-1, reprinted in C. civ. 43-44 (Dalloz 199091). In the United States, the Supreme Court's decision in Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252
(1980) and that case's progeny, have made anything short of a highly formalistic and
unequivocal renunciation of American citizenship of questionable validity. In some countries,
where citizenship is based on family relation and not physical presence at birth, descendants of
persons who emigrated to this country may not even be aware that they are still deemed
citizens or nationals of the foreign country from which their parents or grandparents
emigrated. See also infra note 120.
In one interesting example of enduring nationality, the nationality law of Spain was read
liberally to permit issuance of passports to certain Jews in the United Arab Republic.
Passports were issued to descendants of families that had been expelled from Spain during the
Inquisition in the fifteenth century. See Daniel Turack, The Passport in International Law 225
(1972). The significance of the passport is itself highly uncertain and further complicates the
inquiry into nationality. For example, an American passport has been described as "attest[ing]
that the holder is a lawful citizen." On the other hand, it appears to raise only a rebuttable
presumption of nationality, and does not constitute conclusive proof. Id. at 18, 230-32.
Moreover, one country can apply its own law in determining the weight to be accorded
another country's passport, at least when the issuing country has violated international norms
as to whom a passport can be issued. Id. at 231. Recently, a technique has developed by
which residents of Hong Kong have sought to gain entry into the United States. A 1990
presidential order grants temporary asylum to citizens of the People's Republic of China. The
order was not intended to cover Hong Kong. Since Chinese law regards Hong Kong residents
as Chinese citizens, China has been granting passports to residents of Hong Kong who,
ironically, are asserting their Chinese nationality to escape to the United States before 1997,
when Hong Kong is formally incorporated into China. A case is pending in federal district
court in San Francisco as to whether a person who is a national of China under Chinese law
and holds a Chinese passport is necessarily a Chinese national for American law. See Legal
Times, S. Freinkel, To Win U.S. Asylum, Hong Kong Native Changes Countries 2, Aug. 19,
1991. Quaere how these sorts of issues would be dealt with under the Convention.
The validity of the process by which a particular person was naturalized might also be called
into question. If a question as to the national status or naturalization process of a decedent
were raised during probate or upon a title search, an inquiry would have to be made based on
the intricate nationality and naturalization laws of the relevant countries.
42. See Report, supra note 13, cl.15, at 533 & cl.21, at 535.
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nificantly, the Convention provides no guidance 43 as to the proper
choice of law in this very typical case. 44
43. See Report, supra note 13, cL 51, at 547, acknowledging that the Convention "does not
give a specific rule for dual nationality." The question of a person's nationality and the
resolution of the dual nationality problem is to be left to the forum for resolution. See 1 Ernst
Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study 130 (2d ed. Ulrich Drobnig 1958) for some
solutions that are currently employed. For example, if the forum is one of the national states,
it might apply local law. However, if it is not, any one ofa number ofother approaches might
be taken. There is no clear-cut judicial or theoretical solution to the problem. See Nissim BarYaacov, Dual Nationality 59-62, 159-73 (1961).
44. If a purpose of the Convention is to impose uniformity, reliance on the forum to develop
an approach to varied dual and plural nationality cases actually threatens to undercut the
entire effort toward uniformity. Indeed, certain international commentators have pointed out
that choice of law uniformity will be defeated as a result of precisely such allocation of
decisionmaking to the forum. See, e.g., Kurt Nadelmann, Impressionism and Unification of
Law: The EEC Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual and Non-Contractual
Obligations, 24 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 (1976).
Adair Dyer, a member of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, maintains that instances of dual nationality "are relatively scarce and are
easily handled by the use of common sense." See Adair Dyer, Memorandum of Oct. 12, 1989
9, accompanying letter of Oct. 13, 1989 to Rodney Houghton, Esq., a member of the
Advisory Committee on Private International Law of the United States Department of State.
Contrary to Mr. Dyer's assertion, in this author's view, "common sense" would dictate that in
an increasingly mobile and interconnected world, the problems associated with dual
nationality will likely increase. Certainly, the Hague Conference has recognized the question

as a serious problem for some time. See Hague Convention of 1930 on Certain Questions
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 179 L.N.T.S. 89. See generally Rabel, supra note
43, at 129-31. See also Jeffrey Schoenblum, Multistate and Multinational Estate Planning
§ 9.04 (1982). Many personalities retain dual nationality. For example, not long ago it was
reported that film star Arnold Schwarzenegger retains both American and Austrian
citizenship. See The Independent, Aug. 26, 1990, at 25. In a world in which political
boundaries and nations are being reshaped, e.g., Germany, Hong Kong, the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia, and Sri Lanka, affiliation with a particular country seems in many cases a dubious
theoretical and practical proposition. But see Juenger, supra note 4, at 39 (arguing that the
country that issues a passport has as much an interest as the country that issues a driver's

license).
A nationality standard is also flawed because it fails to take account of the millions of
stateless persons. Again, the Convention leaves this last matter entirely to the forum, which,
apparently can decide "whether a nationality can and should be deemed to be his". Report,
supra note 13, cl. 51, at 549. If the decision is that an individual is stateless and at the time of
death he had no habitual residence for five years, then there would appear to be no applicable
choice of law rule under the Convention. For a country of immigrants and refugees, such as
the United States, this is a highly unpalatable result. Would the traditional choice of law rules
of the various American states apply to such persons? Article 1(1) of the Convention makes
clear that "[t]his Convention determines the law applicable to succession to the estates of
deceased persons." It does not appear to exclude any deceased persons or permit application
of the local choice of law rule.
A recent article estimated the number of stateless persons of Indian origin in Sri Lanka
alone at one million. See Financial Times, Oct. 20, 1988, § 1, at 4. Other Indians may become
newly stateless when Hong Kong is returned to China. John Elgood, British Government
Faces Crucial Test on Hong Kong, Reuters Library Report, April 18, 1990. Certainly, many
prominent and wealthy persons are stateless. See, e.g., Chi. Trib., Feb. 9, 1990, at I(reporting
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Fifth, this nationality choice of law is overridden if the decedent, at
the time of his death, "was more closely connected with another
state."45 The precise meaning of this phrase is left undefined, and
there is no specific guidance of how various factors affect its determination.46 Indeed, the Report47 acknowledges that at least two or more
that the world renowned cellist, Mstislav Rostropovich, has been a politically stateless person
since being expelled from the Soviet Union in 1974). Indeed, the Twentieth Century has been
characterized by mass denationalizations. For documentation and description of this
phenomenon, see Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law 119-20 (2d ed.
1979); Rabel, supra note 43, at 132. The problem engendered an international response in the
form of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
See also Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 293 (1951); Alexander Aleinikofl',
Symposium on Law and Community: Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1471,
1480 (1986). See generally Peter Mutharika, The Regulation of Statelessness Under
International Law (1989); see also Schoenblum, supra at § 9.08.
45. See Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3(3).
46. A preliminary report of a Special Commission associated with the drafting of the
Convention states that: "The difficulty with this term, for those unaccustomed to working with
it, is that it appears almost as a no-rule." Hague Conference on Private International Law,
Preliminary Report cl. 28, Preliminary Draft Convention Adopted by the Special Commission
and Report by D.W.M. Waters, Preliminary Document No. 12 for the Attention of the
Sixteenth Session (Mar. 1988), reprinted in 2 Proceeding of the Sixteenth Session of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law 239, 253 (1990) [hereinafter "Preliminary Report"].
This Preliminary Report "constituted a critical assessment of the preliminary draft for the
benefit of governments," whereas "the present Report is essentially an explanatory document."
See Report, supra note 13, cl. 11, at 531.
The Report indicates that "more close connection" [actually the Convention uses the term
"more closely connected"] is determined by
discovering whether the centre of the personal and family life of the [decedent] was in
one place more than another. Once again, the considerations are his nationality, the
location of his immediate family, his personal ties, the nature and location of his
employment or business, the permanence of his place of residence (his apparent
home), the principal situs of his personal assets, and his journeying and the reasons
for the same.
See Report, supra note 13, cl. 51, at 549; cl. 54, at 551. This standard suffers from intolerable
ambiguity on at least two levels. First, the geographic locus of many of these factors will be
highly debatable in particular cases. Second, there is no methodology for assigning values to
these factors. In this regard, the test is subject to the same harsh criticisms leveled against the
"center of gravity" choice of law theory, of which the Convention's "more closely connected"
standard is one version. Referring to the theory, Brainard Currie wrote:
the trouble with [the] theory is that the quest ... that it enjoined was not implemented by any standard according to which significance could be determined ....
The contacts are totted up and a highly subjective fiat is issued to the effect that one
group of contacts or the other is the more significant. The reasons for the conclusion
are too elusive for objective evaluation.
Brainerd Currie, Comment on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1233, 1233 (1963);
Brainerd Currie, Conflicts, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 Duke L.J. 1, 40 (1961).
See also Robert Leflar, L. McDougal III & Robert Felix, American Conflicts Law 264-67 (4th
ed. 1984) (distinguishing the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and its "most significant relationship test" on the ground that that test focuses qualitatively on policy-weighing
rather than quantitatively on contacts). Id. at 266. Whether this suffices to overcome a similar
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jurisdictions may at the same time qualify as "more closely confnected." It suggests in this case that the country with "the closest
connection" should be referred to, although it also notes that no such
term is used in the Convention itself. This explains the concern in the
Preliminary Report, that "[iln common law jurisdictions a strict construction of article [3(3)] would not permit the court to determine the
closest law as between two closer laws." ' How, then, would such a
determination be made?
It is accordingly difficult to see how these proposed changes
enhance the prompt and efficient administration of estates and distribution of real property. The new standards appear to be litigationbreeders, far removed from the simplicity of a rule that tells the attorney always to look to the law of the jurisdiction in which the real
property is situated. Thus, from both the standpoint of planning and
of distribution of probate assets, the current rule seems preferable.
Admittedly, a strong argument can be made for a more flexible
approach. Such an approach might respect the interests of the situs
and the desire for predictability, while taking account of other interests that might dominate certain cases. The Convention, however,
fails to take such an approach, but instead simply substitutes a more
complex structure of hierarchical rules for the straightforward,
existing rule.49

One argument in favor of the proposed change that has some merit
is that difficult characterization issues would be avoided in the case of
assets that could arguably be classified as either real or personal property. However, in the vast majority of cases, a classification is easy to
make. 0 Even when the classification is not readily apparent, the categorization of an asset as real or personal would not be nearly as difficriticism of the Restatement itself is debatable. Unquestionably, there is substantial ambiguity
associated with any gravity of contacts test, especially when no hierarchy of values or policy
principles are stated. In this regard, the Convention itself does not even list the factors to be
considered. The guidance offered by the Report, as noted, is virtually useless. Moreover, the
precise authority of the Report is unclear. Could the forum ignore some or all of the factors
listed in the Report? Could it introduce other factors? There seems little hope for uniformity
in decisionmaking, only in the ambiguous standard being applied. See also infra text accompanying note 53.
47. See Report, supra note 13, cl. 54, at 551.
48. See Preliminary Report, supra note 46, cl.
24, at 249.
49. See infra text accompanying note 66.
50. See James Pedowitz, Report to the Real Property Division of the Section of Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association 7 (Sept. 11, 1989). Mr.
Pedowitz was liaison of the Section with the American Land Title Association. He was
formerly chief counsel for the Title Guarantee Company. The chairmen of all relevant real
property committees of this Section of the American Bar Association [hereinafter ABA]
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cult as choosing the proper law under the Convention rules.'
The principal argument for, and the primary objective of, the Convention is unity of choice of law rules. 2 However, the Convention
would not accomplish a true unification. To begin with, the resolution of choice of law questions in the case of conflicts exclusively
among the American states is purportedly not affected by the Convention.53 The scission between real property and personal property will
also persist even after the Convention enters into effect because the
Convention specifically excludes from its reach "issues pertaining to
matrimonial property" 54 as well as "property rights, interests or assets
created or transferred otherwise than by succession, such as in joint
ownership with right of survival, pension plans, insurance contracts,
or arrangements of a similar nature."55 Apparently, trusts would also
not be covered. 56 In sum, the Convention does not eliminate separate
concurred in Mr. Pedowitz's Report, which not only questioned the significance of the
characterization issue, but was deeply critical of the proposed abandonment of the situs rule.
Another technical criticism of the situs rule related to the characterization issue concerns
the "escape device" of equitable conversion, that is, that real property can be simply converted
to personal property by the creation of an equitable obligation, such as a contract of sale, or by
holding the property in corporate, partnership, or trust form. Thus, the argument goes, a
distinct choice of law rule for real property reflects an undue obeisance to formalism. In fact,
the success of a particular attempt at conversion is often open to doubt. Moreover, for various
purposes, notably taxation, a person may choose to own real property outright. See, e.g.,
Robert Hudson, Post-1989 Tax Planning for Foreign Direct Investment in the United States:
The Era of the Non-Corporate Vehicle, in International Estate Planning: Principles and
Strategies 215 (Donald P. Kozusko & Jeffrey Schoenblum ed. 1991). As to the conversion
issue generally, the classic work is Hancock, supra note 9, at 293. Professor Hancock
recognized that the equitable conversion theory was an escape device used by judges to avoid
undesirable outcomes resulting from a strict application of the situs rule for real property. On
the other hand, he also recognized that situs law might well be the proper choice of law and
that the equitable conversion theory ought not to be applied as an escape device when the law
of the situs was the appropriate choice. Id. at 317-18.
51. Usually there is a statute, case law, or some administrative ruling giving guidance on the
characterization of a particular property interest. See generally Schoenblum, supra note 46, at
§§ 19.05.9, 20.05.1. On the other hand, the Convention procedures form difficult
characterization issues of its own. See infra note 56.
52. See Report, supra note 13, cl. 23, at 535: "What the Convention does is aim to produce
unity by ending scission, and by introducing a single objective connecting factor for choice of
law" (emphasis in original).
53. But see Convention, supra note 1, at art. 21.
54. Id. at art. l(2)(c).
55. Id. at art. 1(2)(d).
56. Id. The Convention does not apply to inter vivos trusts, since they are "property rights,
interests or assets created or transferred otherwise than by succession"; furthermore, under the
terms of article 14, the Convention does not apply to testamentary trusts. Since the
Convention only applies to matters of "succession," the scope of that term is obviously of
critical importance. Apparently, it does not apply to formal validity of a will, article l(2)(a),
renunciations and disclaimers by beneficiaries, Report, supra note 13, cl. 39, at 541, questions
of capacity, article l(2)(b), construction and interpretation of a will, Report, supra note 13, cl.
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choice of law rules with respect to real property in terms of the estate

lawyer's overall concern with the client's total assets"

Because

much, if not most, wealth is presently disposed through testamentary
substitutes,58 the introduction of new choice of law rules with respect
37, at 541, and matters of administration and transmission of assets, as opposed to the
devolution of assets. Id. cl. 24, at 535. See also article 7(2) which sets forth the precise subject
matter of the Convention: the succession rights of various parties, article 7(2)(a);
disinheritance and disqualification by conduct, article 7(2)(b); advancements and the like,
article 7(2)(c); the disposable share and restrictions on dispositions at death, article 7(2)(d);
and the material validity of testamentary dispositions, article 7(2)(e). If a matter is not
mentioned in article 7, then it is beyond the scope of the Convention, although the forum
might choose to apply the Convention's choice of law rules to any of these other matters as
well. Convention, supra note 1 at article 7(3). See also Report, supra note 13, cL. 24, at 535.
While the Report notes the characterization problem that sometimes arises in distinguishing
real and personal property, see supra text accompanying note 32, a far more troubling issue of
characterization is raised by the Convention itself. Inasmuch as so many issues related to
wealth transfer have been excluded from Convention coverage and will be subject to other
choice of law rules or processes, numerous controversies may arise as to whether a particular
issue is within the scope of the Convention or outside its scope. Each forum will decide these
controversies and may reach quite different conclusions. See Report, supra note 13, cl. 38, at
541. Furthermore, forum-shopping may be utilized in an effort to obtain a favorable result by
selecting the forum that applies a preferred substantive law and characterizes the pertinent
issue as fitting within a category not covered by the Convention. For example, an issue might
be characterized as one of construction, administration, or even formal validity, thereby
avoiding application of the Convention. Forum-shopping would be accomplished by situating
assets in jurisdictions that could be predicted to adopt the desired approach and/or in
jurisdictions not party to the Convention. Experience with forced heirship and taxation
strongly supports the conclusion that persons with "international" estates will go to great
lengths to shift the situses of assets in order to obtain the application of favorable rules. See,
e.g., the following papers, all published in International Estate Planing: Principles and
Strategies (Kozusko and Schoenblum, eds.), supra note 50: Schoenblum, An Introduction to
Nontax Aspects of International Estate Planning, at 1; Lawrence, Planning to Protect Against
Forced Heirship, Sovereign Acts and Creditors, at 65; Armstrong, Selections of a Tax Favored
Jurisdiction for U.S. Investment: Analyzing the Protection and the Costs, at 441; Hughes,
Preferred Jurisdictions for Establishing Investment Pools and Private Trust Companies, at
465; Chopin, Designing a Multifaceted Flight Structure Choice of Jurisdiction and Choice of
Entity, at 471.
57. Note should also be taken of the fact that questions of formal validity are assumed to
have been addressed by the Hague Convention of 5 October 1961 on the Conflicts of Laws
Relating to the Form of Testamentary Dispositions. See 510 U.N.T.S. 177 (1964). Since
almost thirty years have gone by without any widespread adoption of this Convention by
nations, the probability is that conflicts over the form of a will will also not be subject to
uniform law. In the author's view, a more sensible strategy would be to assure adoption of a
uniform rule as to form before proceeding to substance or, alternatively, a coordination of
form and substance provisions in a single convention ought to be pursued. See also note 275
for some progress on a uniform form of will.
A word on "capacity" is also required. While mental capacity and age limitations are all
excluded from the Convention, undue influence, duress, fraud, and mistake may or may not be
covered by it. Each forum, apparently, is to decide whether such matters are, based on its own
law, "matters of capacity," and thus outside the Convention, or "matters of consent," and thus
within the scope of article 7. See Report, supra note 13, cls. 42 & 43, at 543.
58. See Report, supra note 13, cl. 20, at 24. See also Langbein, supra note 47.
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to a decreasing segment of an individual's wealth seems odd when,
perhaps, the majority of wealth held in other forms will continue to be
governed by the existing rules."
Scission would also continue, despite the Convention, because the
situs rule persists in related areas, such as estate administration as
well as state and federal death taxation. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has long held that only the situs state can tax real property. 60
The treatment of real property under bilateral international death
tax conventions is also of considerable relevance. These treaties have
been in effect for years and thus represent a model that appears, from
at least a practical standpoint, to work in an international, albeit,
bilateral setting. Furthermore, because so much of the wealth transfer at both the domestic and international levels is driven by tax factors, there ought to be a strong interest in harmonizing the tax and
non-tax aspects of international wealth transfer.6 ' The tax treaties
permit the United States and another country to tax its citizens and
domiciliaries and those having certain other strong affiliations, even if
their property has a foreign situs. Under the older treaties, 62 the
country taxing on the basis of the strongest personal affiliation has to
allow a credit for an assortment of property interests situated in the
63
other country, including real property. Under the newer treaties
these creditable property interests, based on situs, have been curtailed.
However, because of particularly strong links of real property to the
situs, the United States or its treaty partner must still credit the death
59. Much criticism was leveled due to the fact that the Convention "appears not to be
meeting the needs of those who are concerned with estate planning." See Preliminary Report,
supra note 46, cl. 13, at 243. The Preliminary Report specifically noted the failure of the
Convention to address inter vivos transfers.
60. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 363 (1939).
61. The failure of the Convention to come to terms with the wealth transfer concerns of real
life testators is apparent. The Report states that:
for estate planning purposes testators are particularly anxious to have the local law
apply in that place where their foreign assets are located. Multiple wills are a direct
product of this desire to have local law apply to local assets. Administration is then
more swift, more inexpensive, and much more likely to be free of error. Notaries,
solicitors and attorneys know best their own local laws. The effort, however, [to
introduce the lex situs into the Convention] was not successful, so keen was the
majority of delegations to secure unity.
Report, supra note 13, cl. 27, at 537. Unity for the exclusive sake of unity is hardly a desirable
policy objective and, indeed, in terms of choice of law theory, as well as in terms of its impact
on practical estate planning, has palpable shortcomings. Although the response of the Report
is that the freedom the Convention accords a testator to designate governing law goes a long
way to ameliorate the estate planning concern, this conclusion is open to considerable doubt.
See discussion of article 6, infra text accompanying notes 140-181.
62. See Schoenblum, supra note 44, at 567-70.
63. Id. at 570-72.
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taxes of the country in which the real property is located. In short,
while the newer tax conventions tend to depart from a general situs
rule with respect to other types of property, they adhere, without
exception, to the rule that the situs country in the case of real estate
has the primary taxing authority."
C. The Absence of a Persuasive Theoretical Basisfor the
UnqualifiedAbandonment of the Situs Rule
The Convention's approach to the choice of law question with
respect to real property represents a most unfortunate development
from the standpoint of conflicts law. Even the questionable conclusion that the traditional situs rule ought not be inflexibly applied,
leaves unanswered the question of what rule or process of conflicts
resolution should be substituted in its place.
Even academic proponents of more freewheeling choice of law
approaches than the straightforward rule recognize the potentially
important interest of the situs state.6 They simply argue that in some
cases the interest of the situs state is minimal or nonexistent and that
one must take account of interests and contacts of other states and
their citizens, as well as concerns for comity, federalism, and the multistate system. While no clear coalescence of views on an appropriate
substitute seems to have emerged, there is, as in other areas of choice
of law, a belief that a fresh, more flexible approach is desirable.
Unfortunately, the Convention does little more than install a new set
of rigid rules based on individual affiliation rather than situs and, as
such, is susceptible to precisely the same critique offered of the situs
rule-it fails to take account of other relevant interests, contacts, and
concerns. As with any talismanic methodology, it impedes the development of a more probing conflicts analysis.6
64. Because of these credit provisions, if the situs country's tax on the real property is
greater than the United States tax attributable to the property, the United States retains no net
tax with respect to the real property, even if the decedent was a citizen, domiciliary, and
habitual resident of the United States. United States income tax treaties follow a similar
pattern. Income from real property is treated as having its source at the situs of the real
property. Even though residence is the usual basis of taxation, in the case of income from real
property, the primary taxing authority is allocated to the situs country via a credit system, just
as with the more recent estate tax conventions. See, e.g., Convention and Protocols between
the United States and Canada for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion, signed Sept. 6, 1980, with Protocols signed July 14, 1983 and Mar. 28, 1984,
art. VI, 1986-2 C.B. 258.
65. See supra note 9 and infra notes 68-69.
66. A comment by Brainerd Currie in connection with one multistate succession case is
pertinent:
We begin with a practical problem and imperceptibly get lost in disputations about
HeinOnline -- 32 Va. J. Int'l L. 99 1991-1992

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32:83

The Report indicates that the desire for uniformity of choice of law
rules for succession to real and personal property fueled the change.67
Still, the objective of uniformity does not dictate adoption of new
rules which are no more flexible, and far less predictable, than the
present rules. The Convention's habitual residence-nationality-more
close connection tests blatantly ignore what could prove to be overriding interests of other jurisdictions, not the least of which are the situs
and domicile countries, as well as the interests of the relevant
individuals.
Curiously, the Convention's choice of law solution also blatantly
ignores every modem choice of law theory. Indeed, there is no mention of any of these in the Report. Many of these theories would point
to an important, if not determinative role, for the situs. For example,
if the focus is on state interests, the interests of the situs state are of
considerable magnitude. These interests include: protecting the integrity and effectiveness of the title recording system, 68 assuring the
proper use of the land, promoting free circulation of real estate by
prohibiting perpetuities and the like, protecting the environment, creating reliable procedures that encourage transfers at minimal transaction cost, 69 and confirming the sovereignty of the state through its
control of its own territory. Not all of these factors will be relevant in
every case and in some they all may be absent. In other cases, howthe principles of domicile and nationality as universal rules for choice of law. We
forget that what we are deciding is whether a particular wife shall be conceded

testamentary freedom or whether her husband shall be conceded an indefeasible right
to half her movable estate.

Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 Law & Contemp. Probs. 754, 784 (1963).
67. See Report, supra note 13, cl. 23, at 535.

68. This interest should not be underestimated nor should the problems that would arise if
the approach of the Convention were adopted. As noted in Leflar, supra note 46, at 474-75:
The title searcher at the situs cannot be expected to know the laws of all the other
states in which parties may be domiciled or instruments may have been executed and
other elements in transactions may have significant contacts. Some of these locations
may not even be identified in the recorded documents. In many situations, especially
where bona fide purchasers are involved, the predictability consideration will be the
dominant one, and the only state under whose law this consideration can normally be
effectuated is the state of situs.

Under the Convention, great uncertainty would be created since any probated will could not
pass title safely unless all those who could challenge it had been given an opportunity to be

heard. That would require first a determination of the assets in decedents' estates, the relevant
law, the substance of that law as to heirs, and proper notice. At present, all that is typically
required is notice to heirs as determined by local law.

69. Beneficiaries and potential purchasers must be confident that the procedures used and
rules relied upon will not be upset elsewhere by application of some other law. See Amos

Shapira, The Interest Approach 131-33 (1970); Max Rheinstein, Ehrenzweig on the Law of
Conflict of Laws, 18 Okla. L. Rev. 238, 241-42 (1965).
HeinOnline -- 32 Va. J. Int'l L. 100 1991-1992

1991]

DECEDENTS' ESTATES

ever, some or all may be of overwhelming concern and should not be
cavalierly and absolutely cast aside, as the Convention does.
Predictability" has also received widespread attention from scholars who agree that it should be a crucial element of any conflicts theory." Arguably, the Convention does give some recognition to
predictability in the sense that an individual may, under limited circumstances, designate a law as controlling the disposition of property.
70. Proponents of an interest analysis approach do not deny the legitimacy of the goal of
predictability. However, they elevate other values, such as fairness, due process, and
protection of a state's fundamental policies. See Alden, supra note 5, at 597. Of course, not all
theorists are convinced interests analysis accomplishes these goals. See John Hart Ely, Choice
of Law and the State's Interest In Protecting Its Own, 23 Win. & Mary L.Rev. 173 (1981); Lea
Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and The Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 Mich. L.Rev. 392 (1980).
Predictability, itself, probably ought not be regarded as a monolithic concept. In William F.
Baxter, Choice of Law and The Federal System, 16 Stan L.Rev. 1, 2-4 (1963), the author
discusses three types of predictability. Primary predictability involves the ability to predict the
legal consequences in the future of particular conduct, such as the drafting of a will. Id. at 3.
Secondary predictability entails the ability to predict the position a particular state will take as
to past conduct once it reaches the litigation stage. Baxter describes a third type of
predictability as doctrinal uniformity among jurisdictions. In many instances, any number of
forums may be accessible. The availability of various forums can weaken primary
predictability, unless there is substantial doctrinal uniformity of law.
Taking Baxter's analysis at face value, in the case of an immovable in the United States, the
prospect of forum-shopping will not be relevant in succession matters, since the situs state has
exclusive control over the property and will, thus, be, in most instances, the forum. (But see
infra note 84 for certain exceptions.) As such, doctrinal uniformity is not necessary for
predictability. Moreover, the Convention alternatives to situs severely undercut predictability.
See infra note 266. Still, primary predictability, assured as it may be by the situs rule, fails to
afford any normative basis for selecting the law of the situs as the proper choice of law.
Possible justifications for the application of situs law are considered supra text beginning at
note 65. Nevertheless, since any number of alternatives could be equally justified, perhaps it is
sufficient to accept the situs rule because it fosters predictability and has been widely accepted
in this country.
Note also that predictability must be differentiated from the expectations of the parties. The
parties can develop new expectations as to the governing law and the way it is identified.
Fulfilling expectations goes to the issue of fairness, whereas predictability focuses more on
fulfillment of testamentary intent. See also Alden, supra note 5, at 596-97. Of course, while
the parties could learn to "expect" ambiguity and uncertainty in the transmission of wealth,
they would surely prefer to "expect" certainty and to have the ability to determine for
themselves the disposition of their wealth.
71. See, e.g., Leflar, supra note 46, § 103, at 290; Reese, Conflict of Laws and the
Restatement Second, 28 Law & Cont. Prob. 679, 686 (1965) (indicating that predictability is
most essential in matters involving validity of wills and intestate succession). More recently,
other commentators have emphasized the value of predictability. See e.g., Brilmayer, supra
note 70, at 407; Ely, supra note 70, at 213; Amos Shapira, "Grasp All, Lose All": On Restraint
and Moderation in the Reformulation of Choice of Law Policy, 77 Colum. L Rev. 248, 254,
259-60 (1977). See also Drion, The Lex Loci Delicti in Retreat, in Festschrift fur Otto Risse
235 (1964), stating that governmental interests analysis is "too cumbersome to apply for the
average lawyer in the average lawsuit .... [A]s a practical legal tool it is as fit for the day to
day handling of legal problems as is a scalpel for the cutting of meat."
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However, not only is the right to choose a governing law or laws seriously circumscribed under the Convention, but also it fails to take
account directly of the interests of the state whose land is being
affected. Assuming those interests are important, they should not be
entirely dependent upon the willingness of a testator to invoke the
situs state's law via a governing law clause.72
Finally, the choice of law issue cannot be divorced from the subject
of jurisdiction. In the United States, the Supreme Court has made
clear that with respect to actions in rem, the location of the property
will typically support the assertion of jurisdiction by the situs state.73
Of course, meeting the test for jurisdiction does not mean that the
situs state can or should always apply its own law.74 Still, it does

suggest a recognition in constitutional jurisprudence of very substantial interests of the situs state. For example, the Supreme Court
emphasized in Shaffer v. Heitner:
The State's strong interests in assuring the marketability of
property within its borders and in providing a procedure for
peaceful resolution of disputes about the possession of that
property would also support jurisdiction as would the likelihood that important records and witnesses will be found in
the State.75
72. Indeed, the individual is not likely to do so if the situs state's law is detrimental; yet,
that is likely to be precisely when the situs state would want its interests protected. Of course,
the interests of private parties is an important consideration that is largely ignored in
traditional, governmental interest analysis. Inflexible, rule-oriented approaches that choose
law based on situs or personal affiliation also ignore these concerns, although they may serve
them indirectly by facilitating predictability. Thus, a number of commentators have
emphasized considerations of private parties as an essential ingredient in determining choice of
law. See, e.g., Arthur T. Von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, The Law of Multistate
Problems, 246-50, 253-54, 284-85, 292-93 (1965).
73. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1977). See also Leflar, supra note 46, at
128-32. Of course, there must be satisfactory notice and the cause must relate directly to the
property and not simply be an action quasi-in-rem. For the uncertain status of quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction, see Peter Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially Over International Defendants,
1990 U. Ill. L. Rev. 593, 595 (1990).
74. Indeed, for choice of law purposes, in order for the choice of a particular law to be
made, there must be "significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state
interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981). The question of what constitutes "significant
contacts" remains unsettled. The matter was addressed recently by the Supreme Court in
Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). In that case, which involved thousands of
class action plaintiffs, the Court held unconstitutional the mass application of Kansas law to
all plaintiffs' causes of action, since many involved mineral rights in other states. In particular
the Court emphasized that expectations as to governing law were an important due process
concern.
75. 433 U.S. 186, 208 (1977).
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While these jurisdictional interests do not demand a local governing law, they nonetheless merit some recognition in the choice of
law context. An absolute rejection of the situs state's law cannot be
justified. It creates the anomalous and asymmetrical circumstance in
which the situs state is the principal one with the authority to adjudicate rights in real property, but it is not permitted ever to conclude
that its interests may be substantial enough to justify application of its
own law.
In this regard, the trend in civil law systems, even those that previously did not recognize a scission between real property and personal
property, has been toward enhancing the authority of the situs country and even giving it exclusive jurisdiction over real property. 6 Particularly notable in this regard has been the European Communities'
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters. 7" Not only does this Convention
76. See generally Peter Hay, The Situs Rule in European and American Conflicts Law:
Comparative Notes, in Property Law and Legal Education 109, 109 (P. Hay & M. Hoeflich ed.
1988). See also Donald Trautman, Book Review, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1101, 1110-11 (1986)
reporting the intransigence of civil law countries in insisting on overall control by the situs in
the case of trusts of local property governed by the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable
to Trusts, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1389 (1984) (opened for signature on October 20, 1984).
Article 12 of the trust convention permits a trustee to register immovable assets, or documents
of title to them, in his capacity as trustee or in such other way that discloses the existence of
the trust. However, the same article explicitly conditions this right "inso far as this is not
prohibited by or inconsistent with the law of the State where registration is sought... ." The
American delegate, Professor Donald Trautman, has explained this in terms of the unease civil
law delegates felt about introducing unfamiliar trust instruments into their recording systems.
See Trautman, supra. The Succession Convention being considered by this article lacks any
registration provision similar to article 12. In this regard, it should also be contrasted with the
Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death Act, 8A U.L.A. 124 (1983),
which has been enacted in a number of states. The Act deals with the rights of spouses in
property acquired in both community and common law property systems. Although
community property generally retains its character as between the parties, § 6 of the Uniform
Act excuses a good faith purchaser or lender who takes security from undertaking an inquiry
and such person may rely on apparent title. As the comment following the section indicates,
the relative rights of spouses must not be permitted to complicate the "ascertainment of title
and disposition of assets where adequate consideration is paid." Id. at 132-33. Moreover, § 4
relieves the personal representatives, heirs, or devisees of any duty to determine the surviving
spouse's rights in the property, unless specifically demanded to do so by the spouse or her
successor. The Convention fails to establish similar mechanisms to assure the efficient
operation of the market. It also places the court, to the extent that it is required to advise
parties of their rights, at risk of liability. Indeed, § 4 of the Uniform Act discussed above is
designed "to eliminate such Court's liability for failing to discover the community rights and
to advise the interested party of his rights." Quaere whether a court that fails to identify and
notify the appropriate persons under foreign law of their rights in local real property would
face liability if the Convention were in force.
77. 1978 0. J. Eur. Comm. (No. L304). See also 1988 0.. Eur. Comm. (No. L319/9)
(extension of Convention to non-EC European countries).
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establish exclusive jurisdiction at the situs "in proceedings which have
as their object rights in rem in immovable property or tenancies of
immovable property,"78 but it also "assumes application of the lex rei
sitae. ' ' 79 Similarly, the European Communities' Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 80 links a contract with the
country with which it has its "closest connection". Under the Convention there exists a rebuttable presumption that the situs has the
closest connection, in the case of real property, when the claim
involves issues of title or use of the property.8 ' The new German conflicts statute also incorporates this approach. 2
The Report refers to the mobility of persons within the European
Community as a justification for its anti-scissionist approach.8" Yet,
the trend in European Community matters involving real property
seems to be in precisely the opposite direction. The linkage by the
European Community of jurisdiction and choice of law in the case of
real property and the linkage of both to the law of the situs in the
budding European federation suggests that the existing American
scissionist system may actually be serving as a a model for the emerging confederal and federal systems.
That is not to say that in American jurisprudence, the situs rule has
always been determinative of individuals' rights in real property.
Nonsitus courts historically have shown a willingness to address the
rights of individuals inter partes, while not interfering with the situs'
in rem authority to apply its own law with respect to the property.8 4
In order for its judgment to be effective, the court must obtain personal jurisdiction over the relevant individuals-not always a simple
task, especially with respect to particularly peripatetic persons situated in far-flung reaches of the world. Nonetheless, in many cases,
personal jurisdiction has been attainable. A second obstacle is that
the situs country is not required to give full faith and credit to a for78. See Convention, supra note 1, at art. 16(1) (the general preference accorded domicile is
overridden).
79. See Hay, supra note 76, at 116.
80. 1980 0. J. Eur. Comm. (No. L266/1).
81. Convention, supra note I at art. 4(3). As a result, the general preference otherwise
accorded the habitual residence is overridden.
82. Einftihrungsgesetz zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuche, art. 28(3). See also supra note 23.
83. See Report, supra note 13, cl. 14, at 531-33.
84. See, e.g., Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454 (Miss. 1983); Dority v.
Dority, 645 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982); In re Estate of Janney, 446 A.2d 1265 (Pa. 1982); Ivey v.

Ivey, 439 A.2d 425 (Conn. 1981). Indeed, the situs state as forum may on rare occasions even
defer to the law of the domicile. See, e.g., Rudow v. Fogel, 426 N.E.2d 155 (Mass. App.Ct.
1981). See also Kane v. Kane, 646 P.2d 505 (Mont. 1982). See generally Weintraub, supra
note 8, at 426-27.
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eign personal judgment, as would be true in the interstate context.

Foreign judgments, however, in many cases are given recognition,
especially if deemed fair by American due process standards.8 5
A more systemized approach that gives credit to the situs country's
interests without according them undue credit should be the focus of
the Convention. There are any number of ways to do this. The European Communities' convention might serve as models. 6 Alternatively, the situs of property might be deemed one of several relevant

factors to be considered in resolving a conflict, just as it is in the case
of the Hague Trust Convention.8 7 The important point is that the

situs state's interest88 should not be absolutely excluded from the formulation, whatever it might be. Doing so represents a striking departure from existing American and European law. Furthermore, the
substitute proposed totally ignores the tumultuous debate and novel
approaches that have recently dominated American conflicts theory
and which have attracted much attention in Europe.8 9
D.

The Elimination of the Domicile Rule for PersonalProperty

The complex and nebulous choice of law rules of the Convention
have already been discussed in connection with real property. The

Convention's objective to unify choice of law rules is not accomplished, however, by reliance on the law of the domicile, the standard

consistently used in the United States with respect to personal property. Instead, under the Convention, personal property, as well as
real property, are to be governed by a mixed habitual residence85. See, e.g., Somportex Limited v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Cherun v. Frishman, 326 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C.
1964). But see, e.g., In re Estate of Steffke, 222 N.W. 2d 628 (Wise. 1974); Julen v. Larson,
101 Cal. Rptr. 796 (Cal. Ct.App. 1972). In Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), the Supreme
Court legitimated retaliation if a foreign jurisdiction did not recognize American judgments.
The approach has largely been rejected. See generally Leflar, supra note 46, at 250. The
Restatement (Second), supra note 14, at § 98, urges a due process test for recognition of
foreign judgments.
86. See supra note 80.
87. See supra note 76, art. 7(b). The situs of assets is listed as the second factor after the
place of trust administration designated by the settler.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14, 68-69, and 75.
89. Several of the participants in and summaries of the general debate over the appropriate
choice of law theory are referred to supra note 27. See also Cavers, supra id., in particular his
"seventh principle of preference," which recognizes broad autonomy of parties to choose law
that even overrides the forum's mandatory rules. However, he explicitly rules this approach
out in the case of land, due to "the importance from a functional standpoint of preserving the
integrity of the land law .... ." For the European reaction to the American debate, see
Edoardo Vitta, The Impact in Europe of the American "Conflicts Revolution," 30 Am. J.
Comp. L. 1 (1982) (and ensuing papers); North, supra note 12, at 23.
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nationality-closest
connection-more closely connected-residence ap90
proach.
Although interpretation of "domicile" has generated a great deal of
litigation in the United States, 91 there now exists a large body of common law to serve as a guide. The cases are fact-oriented and there is
general agreement on the parameters of the concept itself.92 There is,
however, no American jurisprudence concerning the meaning of the
concept of "habitual residence. ' 93 Indeed, consistent with other
Hague Conventions, this Convention purposely leaves the term undefined. 94 This would be fine if the concept had a fairly well understood
90. See supra text accompanying notes 37-48.
91. See generally William M. Richman & William M. Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of
Laws 5 (1984). In the area of inheritance there have been a number of illustrious cases in
which courts of different states have reached different conclusions as to domicile. Ordinarily,
the finding of a local domicile has justified the imposition of inheritance tax. See, e.g., In re
Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303 (1932) and In re Dorrance's Estate, 115 N.J. Eq.
268, 170 A. 601 (Prerog. Ct. 1934), aff'd, 13 N.J. Misc. 168, 176 A. 902 (1935), aff'd, 13
N.J.L. 362, 184 A. 743 (Sup. Ct. 1935). The United States Supreme Court refused to resolve
the dispute, denying certiorari in each case, 288 U.S. 617 (1933) and 288 U.S. 678 (1933).
Earlier, the Court had denied a motion to file original action by New Jersey against
Pennsylvania, 287 U.S. 580 (1933). A few years later, in Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley,
302 U.S. 292, 299 (1937), the Court stated that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
full faith and credit clause requires uniformity in the decisions of the courts of the different
states as to the place of domicile, where the exertion of state power is dependent upon domicile
within its boundaries." See also Leflar, supra note 46, at 33. Conflicts scholars have long
argued further that the term "domicile" does not have a "unitary" meaning and that the
meaning of the term could vary with the purpose for which it is being used. See generally
Walter W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, ch. VII (1942); Willis
L.M. Reese, Does Domicile Bear a Single Meaning?, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 589 (1955). The
Restatement (Second), supra note 14, at § 11(2), comment m, recognizes differences in
application for different purposes and states that: "A person may have no more than one
domicile at a time, at least for the same purpose."
92. See, e.g., Leflar, supra note 46, at 19 ("The standard rules concerning the concept of
domicile are fairly firm.").
93. This author could find no American case interpreting the term. See also Leflar, supra
note 46, at 10, noting that the concept "has not caught on in America." The Report also
makes clear that the term habitual residence, as used in the Convention, is definitely not
intended to have the same meaning as domicile. See Report, supra note 13, cl.
51, at 549. At
best, one vague standard with at least several hundred years of common law development,
domicile, would be replaced with another vague standard, habitual residence, having no
common law to provide guidance.
94. See Report, supra note 13, cl. 51, at 549. On the other hand, the Report, in an example
of self-contradiction, also seeks to flesh out the term. Id. at 549. A sharp division exists
among conflicts scholars as to whether habitual residence ought to remain an amorphous
concept. Professor de Winter sought to define its parameters. See L.I. de Winter, Nationality
or Domicile? The Present State of Affairs, 28 Recueil des Cours 347, 430-36 (III 1969). He
actually argued in favor of two distinct concepts, "social domicile" for use in matters of
personal status and "habitual residence" for use as a substitute for domicile in certain spheres
of law. He recognized that habitual residence, "just like the concept of domicile-may well
vary in substance as the underlying reasons for the connection differ". Id. at 436.
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and uniform meaning. However, this is not the case. 95 There are
many unresolved problems with habitual residence: Is it equivalent to
ordinary residence, and, if not, how not?96 Does it have an intent
component, as does domicile?97 Can there be more than one habitual
residence? 98 Can there be no habitual residence?99 Which factors are
Furthermore, the concept of habitual residence might not require the same degree of social
integration in the community as a social domicile would. Indeed, de Winter believed that
habitual residence ought not have a precise definition. Cavers also emphasizes this point. The
reason given by him for not defining habitual residence is to avoid the concept becoming the
focus of inquiry. Rather he argues that interest analysis should be used to identify the
appropriate jurisdiction and then "habitual residence" should be employed merely as a
descriptive term to denominate the jurisdiction selected. In this way, the analytical trap of
searching for the "habitual residence" is avoided. See David F. Cavers, "Habitual Residence:
A Useful Concept?" in The Choice of Law: Selected Essays, 1933-1983, 244, 254-57 (1985).
Of course, predictability is sacrificed by this approach. Furthermore, it presents the difficult
task of identifying the appropriate law without satisfactory normative standards that can order
or weigh competing interests.
95. For widely varying views on the meaning of habitual residence, compare Ronald Harry
Graveson, The Conflict of Laws: Private International Law 194 (7th ed. 1974) ('midway
between domicile and residence"); Joost Blom, The Adoption Act 1968, and The Conflict of
Laws, 22 Int'l Comp. L.Q. 109, 136 (1973) ("settled headquarters at the moment"); Cavers,
supra note 94, at 255 (disagreeing with the "headquarters" theory and viewing it instead as an
undefined connector varying in meaning depending on the case; Cavers also noted that, in the
area of succession, it might be desirable to adhere to the concept of domicile); lean Gabriel
Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws 101 (2d ed. 1986) (a watered-down version of domicile
lacking the requirement of intent); Council of Europe Resolution 72(1): Standardisation of the
Legal Concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" (factual inquiry of residence maintained on an
habitual basis; no intent required, so that a prison is the habitual residence of a prisoner); and
Cruse v. Chittum, [1974] 2 All E.R. 940 (landmark English decision: "a regular physical
presence which must endure for some time" and which entails "an intention to reside").
96. The Report, supra note 13, cl. 51, at 549 indicates that the term is not intended to equal
ordinary residence: "It is a regular physical presence, enduring for some time, and a clearly
stronger association than 'ordinary' or 'simple' residence, of which the [decedent] may have
had two or more."
97. Report, supra note 13, cl. 51, at 549 indicates that it does, but to a lesser degree:
Intention appears to play a more muted role as an element in habitual residence than
it traditionally has done in domicile, and this is why lawyers who are accustomed to
working with domicile as a connecting factor hesitate before accepting the term,
habitual residence, as an equivalent, but finally accept it as a possible alternative.
However, the precise nature of the requisite intention is not addressed. For example, "the
manifest hopes and plans of the [decedent] are also elements that may be legitimately coasidered by the person who would have to know which State is the habitual residence." Id.
98. See Cavers, supra note 94, at 244, 253. ("Two habitual residences would be possible for
the person who is a city dweller from Monday till Friday but a country dweller the rest of the
week .... '). But see infra note 99.
99. According to the Report, supra note 13, cl. 51, at 549, "A person can have only one
habitual residence, because it is the centre of his living, the place with which he is most closely
associated in his pattern of life. For the purpose of determining this place, his family and
personal ties are particularly important elements." But see supra note 98.
The description of habitual residence in the Report closely resembles the description of the
terms "more closely connected" and "most closely connected." It raises a serious question as
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decisive in determining habitual residence?' ° When does habitual
residence, as contrasted with residence, begin and end? 01 Can an
habitual residence, as with domicile, be adopted immediately, or does
it entail a time element? 0 2
Not surprisingly, the prestigious Law Commission of England and
the Scottish Law Commission, in a 1987 joint report,10 3 reached negative conclusions with respect to the use of habitual residence in the
area of succession law and recommended against its adoption as a
general standard in choice of law matters."°4 The Commissions rec-

ommended instead a revised domicile standard that generally parallels the current American conception of domicile. 05
to the need for all of these concepts. For further consideration of the "more closely
connected" and "most closely connected" concepts, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., supra notes 96-97.
101. Habitual residence under the Convention may definitely begin and end at different
times than ordinary residence. See Report, supra note 13, cl. 54, at 551. Presumably, the
determination of actual dates would involve a detailed factual inquiry after an understanding
was reached as to the factors relevant to habitual residence and the relative weight, if any, to be
accorded them. The discussion in the Report leaves unclear whether habitual residence may
persist despite absence from the country. An example is given of a person who returns to his
country of nationality for a year to tend to certain matters. The Report indicates that even
though the center of the individual's life had been one country for five years prior to his death,
he had been away from that country for one year during the five year period. Thus, he had not
been "resident" there for five years prior to his death as required by article 3(2). The Report
does not clarify, however, whether the individual was habitually resident for the entire five
year period. Id.
102. The Report indicates that an habitual residence can be obtained promptly. The
example given is that of an immigrant who dies shortly after his arrival in his new country and
is deemed to have been an habitual resident of that country. Note, however, that because he
was not a resident for five years prior to his death, the law of his national state, the country
from which he fled, may well apply. See infra text accompanying note 106.
103. Law Comm. No. 168 and Scot. Law Comm. No. 107, reprinted in a joint report
entitled "Private International Law: The Law of Domicile," (Sept. 1987).
104. The Law Commission's Report acknowledged the use of "habitual residence" in
certain English statutes relating to jurisdiction and recognition of judgments in family law
matters. Importantly, habitual residence is being used typically in these cases as an alternative
to, rather than a substitute for domicile, and the purpose is to expand the reach of the forum's
jurisdiction. But when these considerations are not relevant, the Report concludes that
habitual residence should be rejected as a connecting factor. After setting forth an exampl6 of
an English oil man working in Saudi Arabia and noting that succession would be governed by
Saudi law if habitual residence were the law-determining affiliation, the Report concludes:
It can be seen from this that the exclusive use of habitual residence would cut the
links between many temporary expatriates and their homeland, isolating them and
their dependents from its law and courts despite their remaining closely connected
with that country. The results would be particularly dramatic where the cultural
background of the country of habitual residence, as reflected in its law, was very
different or even alien to the culture of the person's own country.
Id. at 10.
105. Id. at 43 (in particular, they recommend the abandonment of the English common law
concept of domicile of origin).
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Although distinct concepts, habitual residence and residence are
inextricably linked under the Convention. If a person dies an habitual
resident of one country and a national of another, the law of the habitual residence governs, but only if the individual was a resident (not
necessarily habitual resident) for five years prior to death.106 If the
person was physically present in another country for a year, the
Report indicates that the five year test is not met.10 7 This example
suggests the slippery slope of even shorter absences. Suppose the individual were gone for a day, a week, a month. The fact that the individual maintained his family and other vital interests at the place of
habitualresidence and had an intention to return would, apparently,
not alter the result. If, in fact, this is the case, the Convention makes
habitual residence a hostage to daily, continuous physical residence.
Thus, the instances in which habitual residence is likely to apply when
there is no confluence of habitual residence and nationality at death
are likely to be fewer than expected.

If this is correct, then, the Convention seems to be a victory for
those arguing for nationality as the predominant law determining personal affiliation, since in cases of less than five years residence prior to
death, nationality will apply. Unfortunately, the problems of habitual
residence are mirrored by the problems associated with the nationality standard. To begin with, nationality historically has not been
favored by immigrant nations.10 8 To do so would create the curious
anomaly of applying the law of the country from which the individual
106. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3(2). See also supra note 101.
107. See supra note 101. The Report, supra note 13, cl 54, at 551 gives the following
troubling example:
As another alternative, let it be supposed that the deceased spent a first year in State
H (his immigrant country) and then returned for a year to his country of nationality
in order to care for an elderly parent, leaving his spouse, children, and new home in
State H for this time. Thereafter he returned to State H, but after four years died in
State H, being then habitually resident there. The one year and the four years cannot
be added together to make the necessary five.
108. See, e.g., Kurt H. Nadelmann, Mancini's Nationality Rule and Non-Unified Legal
Systems: Nationality versus Domicile, in Conflict of Laws: International and Interstate 49, 82
(1972); Law Commission, supra note 103, at 55. See also Friedrich K. Juenger, American and
European Conflicts Law, 30 Am. J. Comp. 117, 130 (1982), where the author states:
Whatever one might say about attempts by emigration countries to retain some hold
over their citizens abroad, nations that attract large numbers of immigrants clearly
court trouble if they disregard the very real nexus that group of their population has
with their new homeland. Stubborn insistence on nationality as the only legal tie that
matters is bound to swamp their courts with foreign-law issues. Since it is more
difficult, more expensive and more time-consuming to apply foreign law than local
rules, immigrants are bound to receive a lesser, costlier and slower type of justice.
(footnotes omitted).
Indeed, the nationality principle is reported as "receding" in one of its principal strongholds,
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departed or fled. 19 The application of national law would be particularly pernicious if the individual's country of nationality was totalitarian in nature and severely restricted testamentary freedom. Indeed,
the Preliminary Report confirms that a political refugee, who has
been in this country for less than five years and harbors hopes of
returning to his home, would have his succession governed by the law
of the very country from which he fled. 110 Because of the refugee's
desire to return, the report would deem him "more closely connected" with that country.111 Furthermore, the personal representative of the immigrant who plans to stay in the United States would
have the burden of establishing that nationality should not apply
because the immigrant was more closely connected with a particular
American state.
As noted, the Convention leaves unresolved the issue of dual
nationality. Since dual nationality is quite common,112 even, for
example, in the United States-Canadian context, this is a striking
omission. Apparently, the issue of dual nationality may be resolved
by the forum,1 13 thus carving out another exception to the ConvenGermany, now that that country is confronted with more than four million Gastarbiters
("guest" workers from abroad). Id. at 131.
109. See, e.g., Alexander E. Anton, Private International Law 160 (1967), cited in Law
Commission, supra note 103, at 11. The noted English conflicts scholar commented on the
problem:
The principle of nationality achieves stability, but by the sacrifice of a man's personal
freedom to adopt the legal system of his own choice. The fundamental objection to
the concept of nationality is that it may require the application to a man, against his
own wishes and desires, of the laws of a country to escape from which he has perhaps
risked his life.
110. See Preliminary Report, supra note 46, cl. 27, at 251 ("By contrast the political refugee
from the country of his nationality but hoping one day to be able to return, would remain more
associated with that country than any other, unless the evidence showed otherwise."). If the
evidence shows that the decedent was more closely connected with another country, the
nationality standard is overridden. The burden of proof, however, is on "those who would
argue that the connecting factor of nationality was not at the death apposite." Id. The
relevant evidence would, apparently, include "personal and family ties, etc." Report, supra
note 13, cl. 54, at 551. But the very status of the political refugee would seemingly not be
relevant. See Preliminary Report, supra note 46, cl. 27, at 251.
The situation under the Convention might well replicate the experience encountered under
German law, which followed a rule of the most recent nationality, with respect to Russian
emigres after the Bolshevik Revolution. The immense problems raised compelled a special
treaty relating to succession. See Rabel, supra note 43, at 133-34.
111. Under article 3(2), the nationality standard can be overcome by showing the decedent
was more closely connected with another jurisdiction. But see supra note 110.
112. See supra note 44. The term "dual national" is actually a misnomer. A person may
have more than two nationalities. Dual and plural nationality is an extremely common
occurrence.
113. See Report, supra note 13, cl. 51, at 547-49. For other possibilities, see infra note 118.
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tion's objective of simplified, uniform choice of law rules. Since each
forum in which particular assets are situated may reach an independent conclusion as to the decedent's nationality, there can be no certainty as to which law will be applied under the Convention in the
11 4
disposition of particular assets.
Suppose the alternative choice of the jurisdiction with which the
decedent is "more closely connected" is used.11 5 What does this
phrase mean? As previously discussed, 1 6 the Report recognizes the
vagaries of the concept. The Preliminary Report draws an unfavorable comparison with nationality and habitual residence, which themselves suffer from a lack of precision: "The essence of nationality or

citizenship is rule; the essence of "close connection" appears prima
facie undiscoverable because the term describes nothing. Unlike 'residence' and its adjective, 'habitual', it has no touchstone."' 17 These
latter views echo those of the great comparativist, Ernst Cohn, who
described "closest connection" as "less than 'habitual residence' but
more than mere 'abode,"' and ultimately concluded that "[a]U this is
disputed."1 18
114. The Report, supra note 13, indicates that in most cases dual nationality should not
pose a problem since the dual national is likely to die habitually resident in one of his countries
of nationality. Id. Under article 3(1) that country's law would govern. Contrary to the
Report's conclusion, however, the author believes that there are likely to be many cases in
which this will not be the case. One example would be a dual national of Canada and the
United States who dies while employed and habitually resident in a third country at the time of
his death.
115. Under article 3(3) this rule would apply if the decedent were more closely connected
with a country other than his country of nationality and the preceding habitual residence tests
of article 3(1) and 3(2) had not been met. See supra text accompanying notes 37-48.
116. See supra note 46.
117. See Preliminary Report, supra note 46, cL 28, at 253.
118. Joseph Ernst Cohn, Manual of German Law § 8.12 (2d ed. 1971). More recently,
similar views have been expressed by a prominent American scholar. See Juenger, supra note
110, at 128, stating: "It is obviously a delusion to believe that the words 'most closely
connected' as used by Europeans have any more meaning than our Second Restatement's
'most significant relationship."' Even worse, unlike the Restatement (Second), supra note 14,
§ 6, no principles are set forth in the Convention for determining the more closely connected
country. A comparison in this regard should also be made with the Hague Convention on the
Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition, Hague Conference on Private
International Law, 15th Sess., Final Act (Oct. 20, 1984). See supra note 76. Article 7 of that
convention sets forth four factors to be resorted to in determining the country that is "most
closely connected" to the trust.
In the case of a dual national who does not die habitually resident in either country of
nationality, the Report and Preliminary Report give conflicting signals as to the appropriate
choice of law. The Report, supra note 13, cl.
57, at 551, notes that other Hague Conventions
have left the issue to the forum. However, it does not compel this result. It goes on to state
that "[r]eference to the United Nations Conventions on dual nationals and stateless persons
may usefully be made." The Preliminary Report, supra note 46, cl. 29, at 253, indicates that
HeinOnline -- 32 Va. J. Int'l L. 111 1991-1992

112

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32:83

One further problem arises because there is no succession law of the
United States. Each state has its own law. 119 This lack of a national
successor law is difficult to square with the nationality concept under
the Convention. Of which state is the American a national?1 20 That
is, under the Convention, which American state's law would apply?
The Convention would look to the state of habitual residence, or if
none, the "closest connection" at the relevant time. 121 Although the
rule seems fairly straightforward, on closer analysis it proves to be a
dead-end. Under article 3(3) of the Convention, the law of the state of
nationality is to be applied when there is no confluence of habitual
residence and nationality at death 122 and when the decedent did not
reside at the deathtime habitual residence for at least the five years
preceding death.1 23 Nationality is essentially equated with habitual
residence in the United States context. Yet, a reference to nationality
would be made under the Convention in a case in which the decedent
did not have an habitual residence in any state of the United States at
death. Thus, article 19(3)(b), which provides for a reference to the
state of habitual residence to determine "nationality", is meaningless. 124 This, inevitably, leads one to the alternative under that same
"for the purposes of article 3(2) a court might well take the predominant nationality, which
normally would be the nationality later acquired .... ." However, it then refers the reader to
cl. 69, at 279, which in a revealing statement recognizes that:
[t]here seems to be nothing in the terms of the Convention which would require the
practitioner or the court to look solely to the later acquired, or to the dominant,
nationality. However, article 3, paragraph 2, could cause difficulties. If a citizen of
State A, and of State B, was working with a contract in State C when he died, and the
court concludes he was not 'more closely connected' with State C than A or B, which
'nationality law' constitutes the applicable law?
119. The Supreme Court has recognized the primacy of state law over probate matters and
the states' control of property within its territory subject to probate. See, e.g., Waterman v.
Canal-Louisana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33 (1909). See also In re Estate of Nilheim, 760
P.2d 718, 721-22 (Mont. 1988); Nichols v. Marshall, 491 F.2d 177, 181 (10th Cir. 1974).
120. Note that nationality and citizenship are not necessarily the same. Citizenship
typically entitles a person to certain rights and status domestically. Nationality entitles a
person to diplomatic protection, rights, and identification internationally with a certain
country. See Maximilian Koessler, "Subject," "Citizen," "National" and "Permanent
Allegiance", 56 Yale L.J. 58, 63-67 (1946). See generally Richard Plender, International
Migration Law 29-48 (rev. 2d ed. 1988); Weis, supra note 44, at 4-5; Bar-Yaacov, supra note
43, at 1, 16. Furthermore, while each country ordinarily defines who is one of its nationals,
certain principles of international law may impact on the often complex determination.
Plender, supra, 38-42.
121. Art. 19(3)(b). In an example of tautology, the state of "closest connection" is defined
in article 19(4) as meaning the "state with which the deceased was most closely connected."
122. If there is a confluence, article 3(l) governs. See Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3(1).
123. Article 3(2) governs if there was an habitual residence for the five years preceding
death. See supra note 39.
124. For example, an American national dies while habitually resident in London. He was,
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provision, the undefinable standard of "closest connection."'" In
other words, in the case of Americans living, working, or even serving
in the military abroad at the time of death, the tried and workable
tests of situs and domicile are being abandoned for what appears to be
a far more amorphous and unpredictable standard. Does this really
serve the individual's interests and expectations or, for that matter,
advance a rational theory of choice of law?
Furthermore, the foregoing rule marks an unjust result for nationals of federal countries who at death have had residence abroad for
less than five years. The law chosen will be that of the American state
with which the decedent was most closely connected, even if he is far
more closely connected with another country where, for example, he
is domiciled and has chosen to make his life. In contrast, a decedent
who is a national of a non-federal country, such as France or Japan,
would have his estate distributed in accordance with the law of the
country with which he truly was "more closely connected." 6 In
short, having relinquished his ties with his mother country, the Japanese or Frenchman would, unlike the American, have applied to his
succession the law of the country in which his life is centered.
E. The Absence of a Persuasive Theoretical Basisfor the
UnqualifiedAbandonment of the Domicile Rule
Unquestionably, domicile has not been an entirely commodious
concept, at least when the objective has been predictability and the
availability of a standard that readily points to a single jurisdiction for
choice of law purposes. As has been demonstrated, however, neither
habitual residence nor nationality fit the bill.'2 7 Furthermore, despite
however, not resident there for five years. Since there is no confluence of habitual residence
and nationality and there is no residence for five years, nationality law governs. The problem
is that there is nonAmerican law of succession. The Convention requires, therefore, a reference
to the state of habitual residence at death. Since the decedent died habitually resident in
England, there is no American state habitual residence. Therefore, reference must be made to
the state of closest connection. If the decedent was most closely connected with England, and
his life centered there, which American state should be selected and on the basis of what
criteria?
125. See supra note 46. See also supra note 124 for an example.
126. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3(3). This assumes that the preliminary rules of
article 3(l) and 3(2) do not apply.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 96-114. The principal rationale offered for a shift
from domicile to habitual residence is that the latter concept is not encrusted with the
centuries of particularized jurisprudence that each country using the domicile standard has
attached to that term. See, eg., Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, General Problems of Private
International Law, 143 Recueil des Cours, 139, 191-92, 392-97 (III 1974). Habitual residence,
or any similar term, being pure of such encrustments, is regarded as a means of attaining a
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the Convention's goal of setting forth "a single objective connecting
factor,"'28 it offers up a menu of amorphous, manipulable concepts129
of habitual residence and nationality and entwines them with other
speculative connecting factors, such as the country of the "closest
connection" and the country with which the decedent was "more
closely connected." A Rube Goldbergesque contraption for choice of
law determination is offered up pursuant to which certain desiderata
prompt the application of one choice or another and where the ascertainment of the proper law both before and after death is likely to be
30
nothing short of "Delphic." '1
Instead of building their more intricate, but less useful, "mousetrap," the Convention drafters ought to have struggled with a more
pressing issue-what price uniformity? Should the price be the sacrifice of all semblance of predictability and respect for the expectations
of interested parties?'
Had these qualities of the present system
uniform, worldwide connecting factor with a singular meaning, thereby avoiding a condition
under which an apparent identity of choice of law rules conceals actual diversity. This
condition, characterized by Franz Kahn as the Kollision der Ankniiepfungsbegriffe, KahnFreund, supra, at 393, is, unfortunately, not avoided by simply adopting a new connecting
factor. Since each forum has the authority to define the term, the varying meanings of
domicile internationally will simply be replicated by the adoption of a new term such as
habitual residence. Even worse, the current understanding of what the operative term means
domestically in a particular jurisdiction will be lost for those engaged in planning, since there
will be absolutely no jurisprudence upon which to rely. As for nationality, it has not received a
particularly warm reception from scholars urging adoption of habitual residence as the key
connecting factor. See, e.g., Kahn-Freund, supra, at 190, in which the commentator criticizes
nationality as an example of "continental European parochialism" and considers its use the
reason for the "lack of success" of five earlier Hague Conventions on family law. Other
leading European scholars have been equally critical. See, e.g., Hans Neuhaus, Note to the
Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of 3 June 1971, 36 Rabels
Zeitschrift 372 (1972) in which the author refers to the "obsolete, rotting principle of
nationality which endangers the whole of private international law"; Edoardo Vitta,
International Conventions and National Conflicts Systems, 126 Recueil des Cours 113, 136 (I
1969), in which the author strongly criticizes the nationality standard as inappropriate for
conventions involving "plurilegal" or "composite legal systems" like the United States or the
United Kingdom. See also supra notes 44, 108, and 109; Law Comm. Report, supra note 103,
at 11 (finding nationality superior to habitual residence as a connecting factor, but still inferior
to domicile).
128. See Report, supra note 13, cl. 23, at 535.
129. See text accompanying supra notes 97-119.
130. The term has been used by Professor Andreas Lowenfeld to describe a similarly
uncertain use of connecting factors in the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, "Renvoi" Among the Law Professors:
An American's View of the European's View of American Conflict of Laws, 30 Am. J. Comp.
L. 99, 107 (1982).
131. See, e.g., Convention, supra note 1,at art. 22(1), which goes to the extreme by applying
the Convention to succession to the estate of any person who dies after the Convention has
entered into force. The facts that the individual's estate was planned on the basis of choice of
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been abandoned for a rational attempt to introduce a more contemporary conflicts approach to succession law, it might be justified. No
such outcome appears from the terms of the Convention or the
accounts of its proceedings. Rather, one amorphous connecting factor, "domicile," has been replaced by several equally amorphous
terms. All of these terms tend to reify judicial thinking and impede
the analytical process by which a determination ought to be made of
the appropriate controlling law.
The argument might be made that habitual residence is a more flexible standard than domicile and implicates a state that truly has an
interest. Even if habitual residence were the only standard used in the
Convention, which it is not, this argument is not very persuasive.
Assuming habitual residence is a better standard, it would be better,
under an interest analysis, only to the extent that it did not force an
abstract choice of law, utterly detached from the particular policies
and interests implicated in the case at hand. To the extent there is
more than one jurisdiction which has a stake, and predictability has
been discarded as a guide in fashioning a choice of law rule, each such
jurisdiction's policies ought to be considered, not just the jurisdiction
of habitual residence.
Arguably, the preeminent interest ought to be validation of wills
and effectuation of the testator's intent. This is certainly the guiding
principle in American succession law. It might be contended, however, that while such an application makes sense in the interstate context, it does not address the different policy configuration in the
international setting.'3 2 In this setting, there is often not the same
respect given to the value of testamentary freedom. 133 A choice of
law approach that elevates that value, therefore, fails to take into
account conflicting values accorded greater weight by certain other
jurisdictions. On the other hand, to the extent these conflicting values
law connecting factors that had been in force for hundreds of years or that the individual is
later incapable of changing his will are deemed irrelevant. The Convention would apply, even
though the testator's reasonable expectations and validity of his will would be entirely
undermined. The application of choice of law rules that run afoul of the reasonable
expectations of parties may face a serious constitutional challenge based on a violation of the
due process clause. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814-23 (1985).
132. Professor Russell Weintraub, for example, has urged a validation approach in the
interstate context. Yet, he recognizes a possible difference in the international setting: "It is
likely, at least as between states of the United States, that the difference in the laws will be one
of detail rather than basic policy ....
If, however, the difference in laws is basic and no
substantial inequity would result from invalidation, both states should agree that invalidation
is the proper resolution of the conflict." See Weintraub, supra note 8, at 56.
133. See, e.g., supra note 28 and infra note 145.
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are placed on an equal footing, the contemporary conflicts conundrum of how to balance those interests against one another must be
34
confronted.1
Nevertheless, this author believes that there is much to be said for
the validating approach, even in the international setting. Putting a
premium on validation of wills ought to be a key objective of American policy, since it is an historically shared consensus value of the
states, the source of American succession law. 135 That is not to say it
is the only value to be taken into account. Even in the United States,
there are certain restrictions on testamentary freedom, such as the
elective share or the rule against perpetuities. The Convention ought
to delineate precisely those very few limitations permitted to intrude
on testamentary freedom and the jurisdictions having sufficient interest to demand that such limitations be imposed. This would be an
appropriate approach for an international convention-agreement on
and assurance of the worldwide implementation of a shared multinational goal, rather than an agreement on contact points that may or
may not advance the interests of the testator or the policies of inter134. In a well-known example of this, Brainerd Currie, the father of interests analysis, and
Michael Traynor disagreed on the state with the superior interest in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office,
363 U.S. 207 (1960) (involving an insurance contract). Compare Brainerd Currie, The Verdict
of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 258, 290-94 (1961),
reprinted in Michael Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained and
Enlightened Forum, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 845, 852, 867-71 (1961). See also Leflar, supra note 46,
at 268 n.3.
135. See Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos, Will of Movables in American International
Conflicts Law-A Critique of the Domiciliary "Rule," 46 Cal. L. Rev. 185, 186-87 (1958), in
which the author concluded, after an exhaustive review of all American international
succession cases, that even the domiciliary rule is finessed by courts, if necessary, in order to
"give effect to the intention of the testator and to the domestic and conflicts policies of the
forum." But see Symeon Symeonides, Louisiana's Draft on Successions and Marital Property,
35 Am. J. Comp. L. 259 (1987), who endorses a rigid domicile rule, since it:
satisfies two important substantive policies: ensuring a uniform treatment of the
estate as a single unit in successions encompassing movables in more than one state;
and promoting the justified expectations of the deceased who, in making or not
making a testament or a particular disposition, is more likely to have relied on the
law of his domicile than on any other law.
Id. at 264. Earlier, Professor Cavers, while endorsing habitual residence as an additional tool
in conflicts analysis, thought that domicile probably ought still be retained for succession purposes. Unlike habitual residence, which Cavers felt there might be more than one of, domicile
was still useful, because "we may still think a rule desirable that excludes all but one jurisdiction as a source of law for the distribution of a decedent's intestate personalty." See Cavers,
supra note 94, at 262. Cavers' comments also reflect his own acceptance of a scission between
personal and real property. See Cavers, supra note 89, at 197. Admittedly, his comments do
not take into account the possibility of states arriving at different conclusions regarding domicile. See supra note 91. Still, this would be less of a problem than with habitual residence.
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ested states. 136
With respect to intestate succession, the testator's intent is more
obscure. The goal here should be effectuating the decedent's probable
intent. Admittedly, the proper process for ascertaining that probable
intent is a matter that needs to be carefully considered.1 37 Nevertheless, any reasoned approach along these lines would be a vast
improvement over an approach that blindly applies a contact-based
choice of law rule detached from the intent of the decedent or the
policies of all of the jurisdictions involved. In this case, where planning is not involved and the decedent's expectations of the applicable.
law were probably nonexistent, an approach that favored a more flexi13
ble interest analysis might be in order. 1
Of course, the truth may be that certain other jurisdictions simply
are unprepared to advance the overarching value of testamentary freedom and effectuation of the testator's intent. If this is the case, the
question must seriously be asked whether a convention39with such
countries is even desirable in the area of succession law.
While compromises must be struck whenever reasonable and workable agreements are entered into, the United States ought not be prepared to surrender bedrock policies. 110 Compromises of fundamental
principles tend to have a number of negative consequences. Such
compromises lead forum courts to undermine the convention by
forced interpretations of particular provisions or by giving a wide
136. This validating approach was actually developed by several conflicts theorists decades
ago in the context of contract law. See generally Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the
Conflict of Laws-Part One: Validity, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 973 (1959); Ernest G. Lorenzen,
Validity and Effect of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, Parts I & 2, 30 Yale L J. 565, 655,
673 (1920-21). Since wills, even more than contracts, are voluntary in nature and do not
involve issues of unequal bargaining position, the argument for party autonomy is especially
strong.
137. The current assumptions of many state intestate succession statutes have been
challenged by scholars. See the discussion of several of these works in Jesse Dukeminier &
Stanley M. Johansen, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 78 (4th ed. 1990).
138. A court might receive evidence to establish the decedent's assumptions as to governing
law, such as in a case in which he died unexpectedly before executing his will.
139. In this regard, it is especially noteworthy that the Convention binds a signatory
country to apply the law of a country as determined under the Convention, even if that
country is not party to the Convention. See Convention, supra note 1, at art. 4. This provision
is especially troubling in light of the fact that the Hague Conference has refused membership
to certain countries with unstable or undeveloped legal systems. See Ren6 David, The
International Unification of Private Law, No. 376, at 143 (1973), in 2 International
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law ch. 5.
140. In this regard, see the criticisms of compromises struck in connection with other
Hague Conventions in Michael F. Sturley, International Uniform Laws in National Courts:
The Influence of Domestic Law in Conflicts of Interpretation, 27 Va. J. Int'l L 729 (1987); not
surprisingly, few Hague conventions have received broad acceptance.
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berth to escape devices contained in the convention itself. Second,
they discourage ratification of the convention. Third, if one convention is ratified, ratification of subsequent international agreements is
averted so as not to repeat the "mistake". Thus, the long-term interest in worldwide legal cooperation in the private realm is best served
by honestly addressing basic issues and, if the divergence of policies is
too great, simply not forcing the issue.
F. The Convention and Party Autonomy in Choice of Law
At present, a testator is free to choose the law of any jurisdiction
with respect to the construction of his or her will. 141 This is true
whether real or personal property is involved. In many jurisdictions,
such as those that follow the UPC, this is also true as to issues of legal
effect.' 42 Legal effect would encompass such matters as mortmain
limitations, lapse provisions, elective share rights, and forced heirship
rights. Furthermore, a will can have several governing law clauses,
thereby opting for the law of a jurisdiction that is most favorable on a
particular issue."'
The first point about the Convention is that it limits the voluntary
choices of law a person can make. The language of the Convention in
this regard is not altogether clear. However, it appears that with
respect to "mandatory rules," choices would be limited to the jurisdiction of which the individual was an habitual resident or national at
the time of the designation of the desired law or at the time of
death. 1" "Mandatory rules" are not defined nor are they described in
the Report. There is, however, some basis for concluding that the
141. See UPC, supra note 17, § 2-703; Restatement (Second), supra note 14, § 264,
comment e. Note that construction is not within the scope of the Convention. See supra note
56. The choice of law in this area would remain unaffected and would continue to be
determined by traditional rules.
142. See, e.g., UPC, supra note 17, § 2-602.
143. This concept of depegage may also apply when there is no governing law clause. When
several issues are involved, different states' laws may be applied to different issues, depending
on the particular interest of the state on that issue. Depegage comports with modern
approaches to conflicts that look to state interests on particular issues rather than broadly
consigning all issues to a single state's law simply because the property has a situs there or a
relevant party has a particular contact with that state. See generally Richman & Reynolds,
supra note 91, at 124-26. In terms of a governing law clause, an analogous approach would
permit the testator to opt for the most favorable law with respect to a particular provision in
the will, rather than having to choose a single law for the entire will. A single choice of law
might be helpful on some issues, but detrimental on others and, therefore, would not further
the accomplishment of the testator's intent with respect to the disposition of his assets.
144. Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 5(1) and 6. Obviously the "mandatory rules" would
differ from one habitual residence or country of nationality to another.
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concept was intended to encompass, even if it is not synonymous
with, family protection provisions.145 This would restrict the current
flexibility available to estate planners in certain states. For example,
suppose a French citizen and resident dies leaving much of her assets
with a New York bank. Under the Convention, the law of New York
could not generally be applied to override the French forced heirship
rules. 1 6s A choice of law clause in her will opting for New York
would not be given effect, at least if the testator had not been an habitual resident of New York when she made her designation. 4 7 As a
result, provisions designed in large part to attract foreign capital
14
would be seriously undercut.

1

145. See, e.g., Memorandum from Eugene F. Scoles, U.S. Delegate to John Wallace,
Director, Probate and Trust Division, Section Real Property Probate & Trust Law, American
Bar Association at 4 (Sept. 18, 1989). See also Report, supra note 13, cL 69, at 561 (delegates
opposed to giving the testator freedom in choice of law feared "that the protection of the
family, another object of the Convention, would in fact suffer, because the unscrupulous could
site their assets in States with no family protection laws."). See also Convention, supra note 1,
at art. 24(1)(d).
146. Forced heirship is the doctrine followed in many civil law systems, but only in
Louisiana in the United States, which entitles surviving children, just like a surviving spouse,
to a share of the testator's estate. The doctrine has recently come under attack in Louisiana as
well, where it has been limited to children under age 23 or incapable of caring for themselves.
See La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (West 1991)). This would create the curious situation of American
acceptance of a Convention having as one of its principal objectives, a family protection
scheme that every single state has now repudiated.
147. Apparently, a designation need not be made in the will itself and may even be oral.
These very technical provisions are examined in the Report, supra note 13, cl. 73, at 563. The
intricacy of these provisions ought to be seen as another drawback to their use.
148. See N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 3-5.1(h) (Consol 1991). Furthermore, the
general principle established in the famous Renard case would be reversed, although the result
in Renard itself would be the same due to the testatrix's connections with New York in that
case. In re Renard, 437 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1981), aff'd mem. 447 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1981), aff'd
meo., 56 N.Y.2d 973 (1982). In Renard, a French domiciliary, who had been a legal secretary
at the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, left substantial assets in New York to persons other
than her son. He challenged the will and claimed a forced heirship right under the law of
France. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts in holding that no such
right existed. In addition to the statutory provision, the court engaged in interests analysis.
Specifically, it emphasized New York's strong interest in testamentary freedom, the fact that
Louisiana was the only American state recognizing forced heirship, that the son was not living
in France, and that the domicile rule is no longer inflexibly applied. See generally Robert A.
Hendrickson, Choice-of-Law Directions for Disposing of Assets Situated Elsewhere than the
Domicile of their Owner-The Refractions of Renard, 18 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. .407
(1983); Barbara C. Spudis, Avoiding Civil Law Forced Heirship by Stipulating that New York
Law Governs, 20 Va. J. Int'l L. 887 (1980). See also Letlar, supra note 46, at 549 & n.12
(citing favorably to the result); Yiannopoulos, supra note 135, at 206 ("Whenever the will does
not violate superior policies of the forum essential validity is governed by the law upholding
the will" in international conflicts cases); Weintraub, supra note 8, at 33 ii2. See also Albert
Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 677 (1959), in which the conflicts theorist notes the traditional
use by American courts of various devices and legalisms to avoid choosing to apply a foreign
law involving forced heirship rights.
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With respect to non-"mandatory rules," the testator, under the
Convention, is free to designate the laws of any jurisdiction and can
have different governing law clauses for different assets of her estate.
This seems to parallel UPC § 2-703 (formerly 2-602), but a closer
analysis of the Convention reveals a far more limited right. Indeed,
the application of the UPC in this respect would be cut back in states
that have enacted it.
Specifically, article 19(5)(a) of the Convention makes clear that if a
person designates the law of a state of the United States as controlling
and at the time of the designation or death he was an American
national, the designation will not be valid unless at some time he was
an habitual resident of the state designated. In other words, a lifetime
Floridian, who might under the UPC designate a more favorable New
York law as governing for certain matters, could no longer do so with
respect to property covered by the Convention. 149 Likewise, a foreigner can designate now under the UPC the law of any state to govern the meaning and legal effect of a will disposing of property being
administered in a UPC state. Under article 19(5)(b) of the Convention, only the law of the state of the foreigner's habitual residence at
the time of designation could be used. If he had only a residence in a
state, rather than a habitual residence, he could designate its law, but
only if he had once been an habitual resident in that state.
Furthermore, if a testator, whether an American or a foreign
national, indicates in his will that the law of "the United States" is to
govern, the question remains as to which state's law will be applied.
There is no United States succession law. Article 19(6) states that, in
this case, reference is made to the law of the states in which the various assets are located, absent a contrary showing of intent. Thus, if a
testator wished that his United States situs property be governed by
situs law, he would provide that "United States" law controls. Only
by this stilted, legally incorrect choice of law could he assure that the
local state law of the situs of the particular property would apply.
This artifice, however, could not be employed to override the
mandatory rules of his habitual residence or nation, as determined
under articles 3 or 5(1). With respect to such rules, the testator could
choose only between the law of his habitual residence or nationality at
149. As discussed infra text accompanying note 225, the Convention may well apply to
many, if not most, predominantly domestic American estates. As such, the more liberal rules
of the Uniform Probate Code and those followed even by non-UPC states, will be overridden.
Since an estate planner will not know at the time of drafting or at any later time prior to death
whether the client will have an "international" estate, the Convention will have the in terrorem
effect of discouraging liberal use of choice of law clauses.
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the time of the designation of governing law or death. Thus, in the
earlier example of the Arab investor acquiring Texas real estate,"' the
fragmentation and burdening of the land, as well as the gender discrimination that are consequences of mandatory rules of certain
schools of Islamic inheritance law' 51 could generally not be
52

avoided.1

There are other idiosyncratic dimensions to the Convention's provisions regarding choice of law clauses. Under article 5, if a single law
is designated to govern the "whole of his estate," the testator must
designate either the law of habitual residence or nationality at the
time of designation or at death. 5 3 On the other hand, if he designates
the law or laws of one or more countries to govern the succession "to
particular assets in his estate," article 6 applies and he is not limited
to countries of habitual residence or nationality. Thus, if a will is
drafted so that it mentions the particular law that is to apply to specific "assets," article 5's restrictions as to choices of law can be
bypassed. There does not seem to be any technical or policy reason
for this result,' 54 which will prove an unfortunate trap for the unwary
150. See supra text accompanying note 28.
151. See generally supra note 28. This aspect of the Convention is criticized by North,
supra note 12, at 279-80, who points out that no provision is made for resolving a conflict of
mandatory rules that may exist between the countries of habitual residence and nationality.
152. Furthermore, the problem is not limited to land. The attempt to avoid restrictive rules
at the domicile, for example, can presently be accomplished by selecting a more hospitable law.
The classic use for such provisions is the defeat of forced heirship claims. See supra text
accompanying notes 146-48.
153. UPC § 2-703 imposes no such requirement. Note also that under article 24 of the
Convention a signatory can make a reservation not to apply article 5 if the decedent was not an
habitual resident or national at death or if a spouse or child would be deprived of family
protection to a substantial degree.
154. The explanation offered in the Report is that article 6 represents something of a
compromise finally accepted in order to accommodate the common law countries. Indeed,
article 6 was a late substitute after an unsuccessful effort "to secure recognition of the Iex situs
as a third possible applicable law, in addition to the laws of the nationality and of the habitual
residence." The position of the proponents of this "situs" position was that "testators with
assets in two or more jurisdictions want to invoke the local law for local assets, because
lawyers know best their local law, and the whole process of administration is consequently
quicker, more reliable, and less expensive. Multiple wills are popular in common law
jurisdictions for this reason." The opponents were concerned that the central object of the
Convention, elimination of scission, and a second object, "protection of the family," would be
undercut. See generally Report, supra note 13, cL 69, at 559-61.
The compromise finally reached was to permit limited party autonomy. However, the law
chosen would have to be regarded as rooted in the article 5 substantive law, in accord with the
concept of materiellrechtlicheParteiverweisung. Consequently, any designation of a governing
law could not offend the mandatory rules of the article 3 or article 5(l) country whose law is
indicated under the terms of the Convention. See Report, supra note 13, cls. 68-71, at 559-61.
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or uninformed. It will also require redrafting of the will each time
assets of value are acquired.
In affording the more flexible choice of law option under article 6,
the purpose was, in part, to provide a substitute to multiple wills. 15
Multiple wills are commonly employed in international estate planning.5 6 The technique involves separate wills drafted consistently
with local rules for assets situated in each jurisdiction in which assets
will be administered. Multiple wills would no longer be feasible under
the Convention, since the law of the habitual residence or nationality
would control, rather than that of the local jurisdiction in which relevant assets are situated. Article 6 is intended as a substitute. It permits selection of situs law with respect to particular assets. Those
assets, however, may have to be expressly referred to in the will. Article 6 specifically states that "[a] person may designate the law of one
or more states to govern the succession to particular assets in his
estate." 157 The use of the term "particular" could be read as requiring an actual identification of the assets to be covered. 58 On the other
hand, the Report suggests that the designation would suffice if it
referred, for example, "to my assets in North Carolina."'5 9 However,
since the testator cannot be certain in many cases what assets he will
own at death or where they will be located, article 6 is likely to prove
of limited utility in the planning of estates.
The uncertainty regarding the proper designation for article 6 purposes is reinforced by article 5(4). That article specifies that the chosen law will apply to the entire estate, "in the absence of an express
contrary provision by the deceased." The express contrary provision
is made under the authority of article 6. However, the form that the
"express contrary provision" should take is never indicated; nor is the
law determining its validity. Thus, the "magic words" could very
well differ from one forum to the next. For example, assume a testator has Florida and French wills. The Florida will is executed one
See also Ole Lando, Contracts No. 25, at 13 (1976) in 3 International Encyclopedia of
Comparative Law ch. 24.
155. See supra note 154.
156. See 1 Schoenblum, supra note 44, § 16.16.3; Henry S. Ziegler, Typical Plan, in
International Estate Planning: Principles and Strategies, supra note 50, at 193, 198-200.
157. Emphasis added.
158. The manner in which such assets would have to be identified is left unanswered. See
infra text accompanying notes 159-161.
159. See Report, supra note 13, cl. 73, at 563, which also states that, in view of article 5(4)'s
requirement of an "express" designation, a designation might not be express if it "does not
particularize that it is to apply to assets or the particular assets in the particular situs only." In
contrast, UPC, supra note 17, section 2-602 requires no such specification of assets.
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week before the French will and states that Florida law is to apply.
The French will says that French law is to apply. Each will expressly
limits its scope to assets in the respective jurisdictions, but neither will
expressly states that the law otherwise applicable to the estate under
the Convention does not apply. In this case both the Florida and the
French designation would be valid as long as the decedent was not an
habitual resident or national of one of the two jurisdictions at the time
of designation or death.110 If he was, however, then that jurisdiction's
law would govern the entire estate because no "express contrary provision" was made.161
Semantic traps lie in wait even if only one will exists. Suppose the
testator designates the law of "my habitual residence to govern succession to my estate." At death, he is an habitual resident, nonnational of Italy, but was not an habitual resident or national of that
country at the time of designation of the governing law. The choice of
law clause will not be given effect, even though his center of interests
is clearly in Italy and he intended its law to apply. The designation is
invalid because it does not point to a chosen law. Specific reference
would have to be made by name to the country or by reference generally to the law of the country of habitual residence or nationality, "at
the time of designation" or "at the time of death." 62 Instead, article
3 will control and Italian law would apply only if the testator in the
example had been an Italian resident for the five years prior to his
death.
Far from resolving conflicts and simplifying problems, the Convention, with its highly mechanistic and technically complex 16 3 choice of
governing law provisions, will have the effect of driving people to use
160. In this case, article 5 does not come into play. Instead, article 6 would be regarded as
replacing article 3, which determines the law when a designation for the entire estate has not
been made. When article 3 is being overridden by a governing law clause the assumption is
that the article 6 choice only applies to the assets covered by the particular will. See Report,
supra note 13, cl. 73, at 563.
161. Article 5(4), thus, assumes, absent a contrary directive, that the law of habitual
residence or nationality, if designated in any will, applies to the entire estate.
162. See Report, supra note 13, cl. 62, at 555.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 37-48. Other difficult issues would include the
effect of a revocation by a later will of a will with a designation of governing law in it; the
ability to designate or change a governing law by codicil; and the relevant law for determining
the validity of the designation itself. For example, the formal validity of an article 6
designation would be governed by the article 3 or article 5(1) law incorporating it and not by
forum law. See Report, supra note 13, cl. 65, at 557. On the other hand, the forum would
decide whether the article 6 designation is "express," so that a general article 5(l) designation
can be overridden with respect to particular assets. See id. cl.
73, at 563. See also the complex
chart in the Report setting forth the numerous permutations regarding designations of choice
of law. Id. cl. 72, at 561.
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alternatives to the will. 164 In this way, individuals will preserve maximum flexibility in terms of choice of law and avoid the restrictions on
testamentary freedom that their home jurisdictions might impose.
For the American with property in other states as well as other
countries, drafting choice of law clauses could prove especially sticky.
Far more choices of law could potentially be made for assets situated
in other states than for property situated abroad. Thus, fixing the
location of various assets on a regular basis would become critical. 65
From the foregoing, the conclusion is unavoidable that the choice
of law designations permitted by articles 5 and 6 of the Convention
are wholly inadequate. As with other aspects of the Convention, too
much emphasis was placed on compromises at the expense of a sound
choice of law approach. The purpose of limiting the testator's freedom to choose governing law is protection of the family. 166 It is submitted, however, that a convention concerned with choice of law in
the field of international succession is not an appropriate vehicle for
addressing the substantive issue of family protection. This is especially the case, because different societies and, sometimes, cultures
within those societies have strikingly diverse conceptions of the family
and the obligations of its members. Certainly their conceptions could
differ from those of the United States or other Western societies. The
Convention pertains "to the law applicable to succession" and, thus,
should not have as a principal objective the worldwide, indiscrimi' 67
nate, institutionalization of "family protection."'
The restrictions imposed by the Convention are especially troubling
because the American states, in particular, have a long history of
opposing the concept of forced heirship, whereby children are absolutely entitled to a share of their parents' estates. 68 American courts
have consistently avoided enforcement of such rights, even when conflicts analysis would have suggested enforcement. 69 As noted, certain
164. See Report, supra note 13, cl.
61, at 555. The Report states: "Designations are not to
be made lightly, and professional advice is obviously an advantage, particularly for an
institution like this which is so new. Long passages of time should never be allowed to pass
before a will is reviewed, but applicable law designation is now another instance of where
review is very important." Id. cl.63, at 555.
165. Fixing the location of assets can prove an extremely frustrating task that yields no
reliable conclusion. See Schoenblum, supra note 44, §§ 11.04, 16.07, 19.05.
166. See supra text accompanying note 145.
167. There is no evidence that any serious consideration was given to the relative merits of
different family protection systems. Indeed, the Report indicates an interest in determining
which country's protection system applies, not which one is superior. See Report, supra note
13, cl. 19, at 533.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48.
169. See id.
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American jurisdictions have enacted explicit provisions to attract foreign capital of individuals seeking to escape such restrictions on testamentary freedom. 170 The Convention's decision to favor those
restrictions was, apparently, undertaken without any review of the
economic or social consequences of the decision by leading domestic
experts in these fields. Not insignificantly, the one American state
that has recognized forced heirship rights-Louisiana-has recently
171
circumscribed them.
The appropriate course, in this author's opinion, would have been
to steer clear of more disputable substantive judgments and to institute a choice of law methodology that would determine on a case by
case basis whether the overarching principle of testamentary freedom
should be overridden. 172 In contrast, the Convention chooses policies
relating to "family protection", whatever they may be in a particular
case, over the preeminent common law policy of testamentary freedom. Because a number of countries have rather extreme limitations
on such freedom and use the concept of "family protection" to
enforce patterns of ownership that are actually discriminatory on a
racial, gender, religious, or economic and class basis, the Convention
is likely to result in entrenchment of archaic restrictions on the free
flow of wealth across international borders and unjust treatment of
many individuals.
There is a flip side to what has just been discussed. Arguably, not
all restrictions on testamentary freedom through choice of law are
indefensible. 173 Every society imposes some. If there are certain
widely accepted norms, such as spousal protection, they should not be
enforced only when imposed by the habitual residence or country of
nationality, as the Convention does. The situs state, domicile, or even
some other jurisdiction may be able to demonstrate the sort of fundamental interest to justify ignoring a governing law clause and enforcing an appropriate restriction.
Admittedly, if all designations of choice of law by the testator
under the Convention were limited to the habitual residence or
170. See supra text accompanying note 148.
171. See supra note 146.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 135-36.
173. See id. Even if defensible, they may not be administrable. For example, certain
countries give courts broad discretionary authority over determining what the spouse needs
and should receive. Under the Convention, would the forum have to exercise discretion on a
continuing basis as would ajudge in the country where its law is applicable? What if there is
no forum provision granting continuing jurisdiction? See J.G. Miller, Family Provision on
Death-The International Dimension, 39 Int'l & Comp. LQ. 261, 286-87 (1990).
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nationality at death, such choices would at least be consistent with the
Convention's preferences as to the law that should govern succession.
The Convention, however, also permits a designation of the law of a
nationality or habitual residence at the time of execution of the will.
There appears to be no persuasive principle supporting this option.
These jurisdictions have no particular significance in terms of testamentary transfers under the Convention's rules or any choice of law
system. Article 6 of the Convention goes even further, it negates the
proposition that a testator need have even this inconsequential connection with the jurisdiction that is to have its law applied. 74 Under
article 6, no such connection is required. Article 6, however, can be
invoked only if the testator refers to particularassets and not to the
entire estate.
The absence of a coherent theoretical approach regarding designation of governing law is also apparent in article 6's requirement that a
choice with respect to any assets will not be permitted to prejudice the
application of the "mandatory rules of the law applicable according to
Article 3 or Article 5, paragraph . '' 175 As was previously noted, the
Report gives family protection laws as a prime example of such rules.
Nowhere in the Convention or the Report, however, is the broader
meaning of "mandatory rules" defined. In fact, the term could
include any sort of limitation on testamentary freedom. 76 Essentially, it could cut the substance out of article 6, as the very reason for
selecting a different choice of law is to avoid the "mandatory rules" of
the otherwise governing law.1 77 The failure to define or give guidance
174. There has been an ongoing debate, primarily in the context of contract law, as to the
extent of party autonomy to choose the governing law. Many of the same issues would seem to
apply in the area of succession law. Specifically, commentators have expressed two major
concerns. The first is the undue surrender of law-making authority to the party. See, e.g., H.
Batiffol, Contrats et Conventions, No. 45 in Encyclopedie Dalloz, I Repertoire de Droit
International (1968). The second is the fear that a party may "evade the policies of the state
whose laws would otherwise be applicable." David F. Cavers, Re-Restating the Conflict of
Laws: The Chapter on Contracts, in The Choice of Law: Selected Essays, 1933-1983, supra
note 94, at 59, 72.
175. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 6.
176. The concept of "mandatory rules" has received wide recognition in Europe and has
been incorporated into a number of international conventions. Its ill-defined parameters in the
context of the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980 O.J. Eur.
Comm. (No. L 266/1), have been criticized. See, e.g., David F. Cavers, The Common
Market's Draft Conflicts Convention on Obligations: Some Preventive Law Aspects in the
Choice of Law: Selected Essays, 1933-1985, supra note 94, at 263, 272-79 (1965); Lowenfeld,
supra note 130, at 104-06. See also Rodolfo De Nova, Historical and Comparative
Introduction to Conflict of Laws, 118 Recueil des Cours 434, 531-38 (II 1966).
177. For a consideration of the effect of "mandatory" legislation on the unilateralist theory
of private international law, see Pierre Gothot, Le Renouveau de la Tendance Unilateraliste en
HeinOnline -- 32 Va. J. Int'l L. 126 1991-1992

1991]

DECEDENTS' ESTATES

as to what are "mandatory rules" is a very troubling aspect of the
Convention, because it contributes to the Convention's general bias
against international testamentary freedom and in favor of the
wooden rules of articles 3 and 5 for identifying the governing law in
matters of succession."'

Choice of law clauses in wills are often most effective if drafted on
an issue by issue basis. For example, a choice of one state's law may
be made because it has the most favorable rule as to gifts to charity.
Another state's law may be selected on the matter of the rule against
perpetuities. Finally, a third law may be designated for issues of trust
administration. Here, too, the Convention falls short. It does not

appear to permit such multiple designations. Instead, it permits the
choice of all of the law of a jurisdiction, even though sophisticated
estate planning and the effectuation of a testator's intent necessarily
involves an issue by issue approach. 179 Indeed, the fundamental
Droit International Priv , 60 Rev. Critique Droit Int'l Priv6 1, 209, 415 (1971). See also
Cavers, supra note 176, at 276. In commenting upon the Common Market's Draft Conflicts
Convention on Obligations, supra note 80, Cavers raises the following cautionary note: "If the
convention should become effective with article 7 (the mandatory rule provision] intact,
conceivably we may observe an epidemic of national laws labeling their protective laws as
compulsory and exclusively applicable." Cavers, supra, at 276. Cavers relied in part on the
writings of Arthur Nussbaum. See Arthur Nussbaum, Principles of Private International Law
69-73 (1943) who presented the argument that mandatory rules, which he termed "spatially
conditioned internal rules," were not conflicts rules at all. Indeed the "spatially conditioned
internal rule as far as it goes overrides a Conflict rule to the contrary." Id. at 72. Based on
positive policies of the forum and a spatial relationship to the forum, the choice of law the
forum might otherwise make is not made. The corresponding French concept is that of
"directly applicable rules" (regles d'applicationimmediate) and the German civil code, in the
Introductory Law art. 30, sanctions bypassing the prescribed choice of law when it is against
the purpose of a German statute ("gegen den Zweck eines deutschen Gesetzes"). Lando, supra
note 154, No. 73, at 38 n.319. The Convention appears to take this mandatory rule theory one
step further and in a way that dislodges it from its theoretical foundation. The mandatory
rules that the testator's reliance on article 6 cannot override are those of the countries of
habitual residence or nationality, not necessarily those of the forum. As a result, the
mandatory rule concept becomes just one more facet of the choice of law process and not a
case of the forum choosing to apply its own dominant internal rule Once the mandatory rule
concept is cut loose from the forum, however, there is no longer a compelling reason why the
policies of the countries of habitual residence and nationality should be given precedence over
the policies of other interested countries. Moreover, the habitual residence or nationality
country is being given the opportunity to neutralize the party autonomy rule of article 6,
without any obligation to balance the importance of their internal policies against their prior
concurrence in the multilateral endorsement of testamentary freedom and party autonomy as
represented by article 6.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 131 and 137.
179. Had the Convention limited article 6 to a single choice of law for all assets, this would
have been at least explainable as a repudiation of depeage. Indeed, most countries in the
contract setting reject depegage. See Lando, supra note 154, No. 2, at 3. Lando opposes
depegage on the ground that it artificially divides the agreement, which ought to be upheld and
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approach of modem conflicts analysis is precisely this issue-oriented
methodology.180
This detachment from the practical and efficacious design of choice
of law clauses is also evident in the lack of concern for the duplication
of effort that would be called for under the Convention. For matters
of construction, as well as for areas of law such as trust administration, the limitations of the Convention on governing law clauses will
not apply. Thus, the same will may be required to have an assortment
of choice of law clauses, some more restrictive than others, without
any logical basis for distinction. Obviously, this will exert considerable pressure on courts to classify the subject matter in ways that will
either expand or contract the scope of the clauses.""1 For example, an
effort might be made by a forum sympathetic to testamentary freedom
to classify issues as questions of construction and estate or trust
administration so as to bypass the one choice-per-asset rule of the
Convention or simply to exclude the matter entirely from the scope of
the Convention. Once a decision has been made to permit the testator
to choose, there is no plausible explanation for limiting the choice to
one per asset rather than one per issue.
Certainly, the Convention approach would deviate sharply from

that of the UPC. The UPC, representing the principal reform effort
in American succession law during the last generation, has taken a
enforced as an integrated unit. Any other position, he maintains, leads to difficult problems of
characterization of issues. Id. No. 24, at 12. Despite this position, there is a long tradition of
depegage in civil law systems. Von Savigny emphasized in the area of contracts that the seat of
the contractual obligation was the governing law, regardless of the forum. Thus, in a bilateral
contract involving performance by the parties in different countries, the result could be
different laws being applied to different obligations or issues arising under the contract. Id.
No. 22, at 11.
180. See generally Richman & Reynolds, supra note 91, at 124-26; Lando, supra note 154,
Nos. 19-20, at 9-10. The Restatement (Second), supra note 14, § 188 adopts this approach.
Some authors have actually suggested going beyond depegage to resolution of particular issues
by the shaping of a new rule after consideration of the policies of all concerned states. See, e.g.,
Russell J. Weintraub, Beyond Depegage: A "New Rule" Approach to Choice of Law in
Consumer Credit Transactions and a Critique of the Territorial Application of the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, 25 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 16 (1974); Arthur T. von Mehren, Special
Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role And Significance in Contemporary
Choice of Law Methodology, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 347 (1974). See also Joseph W. Singer, Real
Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 47-59 (1989) (giving thorough consideration to the arguments of
those favoring a choice of "better" law). See also supra note 143.
181. In short, while the testator cannot plan issue by issue, the limited scope of the
Convention indirectly fosters precisely this result. It should be emphasized that issue by issue
choice of law has been the traditional approach in succession, with issues of will formality,
capacity, substantive validity, legal effect, construction, and interpretation being treated
distinctly. See Restatement (Second), supra note 14, §§ 260-264. See also Dicey & Morris,
supra note 18, ch. 27 (for a consideration of the similar English approach).
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more liberal approach to choice of law clauses, consistent with its general furtherance of testamentary freedom and the testator's intent.
Section 2-703 of the Code allows the testator to choose the law that
will govern a disposition in a will. Unlike the Convention, the Code
does not require an express reference toparticularassets in order to be
able to designate freely a jurisdiction's law as governing. Nor is there
a limit of one choice of law per asset, rather than per issue. Technical
obstacles of this sort are not imposed by the Code and any law can be
chosen to apply to the entire estate, not just that of the habitual residence or nationality. While there are restrictions preventing avoidance of elective share, exempt property, or family allowance
provisions, and any other public policy restriction, the restrictions are
those of the forum jurisdiction. 8 2
G. Additional Concerns-Proofof Foreign Law, Renvoi, and the
Incidental Question
L

Proofof Foreign Law

One of the most complex areas of choice of law, especially when a
foreign country is involved, is the proof of that law, once a choice of
its law is indicated. The topic justifies distinct treatment in a separate
article, although some of its implications for the Convention will be
explored. The crucial point is that identifying the applicable law
under the Convention is only the first step. A highly technical and
conceptually dubious process of implementation will have to be
undertaken. While this is true of the choice of law process generally,
the Convention will exert new pressure on the process. For the first
time in this country, proof of foreign law with respect to succession to
real property will have to be established. Furthermore, the application of that law will hinge on prior determinations of foreign law and
facts regarding habitual residence and nationality. Finally, the stated
objective of the Convention-uniformity in choice of law-will be
shown to be an entirely unattainable goal, because the approach of
many forum courts will be simply to apply their own law. On the
other hand, because the testator cannot be certain of this, the actual
law likely to govern will appear entirely incapable of prediction at the
planning stage.
182. UPC § 1-301 which provides in relevant part that the Code applies to decedents
domiciled in the state and the property of "nonresidents" (presumably meaning
nondomiciliories) located in the state. One aspect in which the Convention goes further than
the UPC is that § 2-703 appears only to apply to legal effect and not to the substantive validity
of a will.
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These consequences are not limited to real property. At present,
the law of domicile is well defined. Thus, facts can be marshalled to
ensure that the law of a particular state or country-qua domicilewill be applied to the disposition of personal property. On the other
hand, the concept of habitual residence may purposely remain illdefined.'1 3 Moreover, foreseeability as to one's final residence is
largely impossible and if time is spent in two locales, entirely uncertain. As for nationality, the laws of the diverse countries can be so
arcane as to make the task of proof awesome.18 4 Preliminary choice
of law questions as to which country's law determines status would
also have to be surmounted.
In addressing the proof of foreign law issue, a brief summary of
current jurisprudence is in order. The topic has been highly controversial, sharply dividing courts. Traditionally, a large number of
states have considered the matter a question of fact. 8 5 Thus, the issue
has been one for jury determination or for the court as trier, with the
burden on the party seeking to establish foreign law. In the absence
of satisfactory proof, the presumption of identity of foreign law with
forum law has ordinarily been invoked.' 8 6 The underlying premises
for this presumption are varied and, in fact, have often been ignored
by courts relying on it. The presumption generally does not extend to
other countries' statutes.8 7 For most states, it also does not apply to
the law of countries with different legal systems.'
In these cases,
varying approaches have been taken to the application of local law.
Some courts have directed verdicts or have dismissed cases on the
18 9
ground that an essential fact has not been adequately proved.
183.
184.
185.
foreign

See supra text accompanying note 94.
See, e.g., supra notes 41, 44, & 108.
Indeed, this is the common law position. See Leflar, supra note 46, at 356-57. Proof of
law is typically established by the testimony of experts knowledgeable of the foreign

law. Id.

186. The origins of this presumption are traceable to Lord Mansfield in his opinion in
Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1028 (K.B. 1774), reiterated by Chief Justice Marshall
in Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804). See generally Scoles & Hay, supra note 5,
at 404.

187. See, e.g., Cuba Rail Road v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 479 (1912); Philp v. Macri, 261
F.2d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 1958). See also In re Marriage of Osborn, 564 N.E.2d 1325, 1327 (Ill.
App. 1990).
188. See id. See generally Leflar, supra note 46, at 358.
189. See, e.g., Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
872 (1956) (directed verdict in absence of proof of Saudi law); Riley v. Pierce Oil Corp., 156
N.E. 647 (N.Y. 1927) (dismissed in absence of proof of Mexican law). Cf. Vishipco Line v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 859 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976
(1982).
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Other courts have simply applied forum law' 9° or maintained that the
parties have acquiesced in application of forum law.1 91 On the other
hand, certain courts have extended the presumption of identity of law
to cases involving the law of a foreign country with a different legal
system.' 92 Whatever the escape device, these are all dissembling techniques for avoiding choosing a foreign law and clearly do not bode
well for a convention founded on uniform choice of law rules to be
applied by all signatories.
Some efforts have been made to standardize the approach to the
reception of foreign law. For example, the Uniform Judicial Notice of
Foreign Law Act, proposed in 1936, has been adopted in a large
number of states. 193 While still an issue of fact, foreign law is treated
as a matter of judicial notice to be decided by the judge, with the
assistance of opposing counsel. 194 While a few states have made the
law applicable to foreign countries, 95 the Act itself does not extend
that far.196 In contrast, the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act 197 does apply to the law of other countries as well. 19 8

Moreover, the court is empowered to ascertain foreign law in a manner akin to that pursued by civil law judges.1 99 In this regard, the

decision of the trial court is reviewable on appeal as a question of
2
law. 00
With respect to federal courts, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1
is modeled after the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure
Act, but also has distinctive requirements. Regarding the law of foreign countries, a district court can make the determination of foreign
law after notice by counsel. The burden of proof is on the party relying on foreign law and failure to prove or raise the issue will result in
application of local law. The normal rules of evidence are inapplicable and a wide-ranging inquiry is permitted. 2° '
190. See, e.g., Bayer v. Lovelace, 90 N.E. 538, 539 (Mass. 1910).
191. See, e.g., Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 265 N.E.2d 739, 743 (N.Y. 1970).
192. Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638, 641 (10th Cir. 1962); Louknitsky v.
Louknitsky, 266 P.2d 910, 911 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954).

193. 9A U.L.A. 553 (1965).
194. Id. § 5.
195. See, e.g., NJ. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:82-27 to 2A:82-33 (West 1991); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc.
Code Ann. §§ 10-501 to 10-507 (1988).
196. Supra note 193, §§ 1, 5. See also Milwaukee Cheese Co. v. Olafsson, 162 N.W.2d 609
(Wis. 1968).
197. 13 U.L.A. 459 (1980).
198. Id. §§ 4.01-4.04.
199. Id. § 4.02. See also Scoles & Hay, supra note 5, at 408.
200. Id. § 4.03.
201. Fed. R Civ. P. 44.1 provides in relevant part: "The court, in determining foreign law,
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The picture abroad is at least as varied as in the United States. As a
general matter, English law regards foreign law as a question of
fact; 20 2 so too does French law. 20 3 In Scotland 204 and in most civil
law countries the situation is otherwise. Foreign law is a question of
law. Moreover, the court must make the determination ex officio,
often without the assistance of the interested parties.20 5
The Convention blithely ignores the diversity of approaches to the
proof of foreign law question, even though resolution of the question
is central to the accomplishment of the goal of international uniformity in choice of law. Until the processes of proof of foreign law are
unified, the designation of rules of choice of law can never be more
than an abstract accomplishment of uniformity, that is, devoid of substance in the real world. Indeed, even if uniformity in approach to
proof of foreign law were incorporated in the Convention, the conclumay consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted
by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence."
202. See Dicey & Morris, supra note 18, at 217. But see the recent decision in Furness
Withy (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Metal Distributors (U.K.) Ltd. (the "Amazonia"), [1989] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 403 (Q.B.), aff'd [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 236 (C.A.). The court held that a mutual
mistake as to the governing law and its effect was a mistake of law and not of fact, even though
the mistake involved the applicability of Australian law. Furthermore, a method for certifying
the question to a court of the foreign jurisdiction exists for commonwealth and former
commonwealth countries. See British Law Ascertainment Act, 1859, 22 & 23 Vict. c. 11.
203. For a thorough discussion of the historical and jurisprudential development of the
French position, see Stephen L. Sass, Foreign Law in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Survey,
16 Am. J. Comp. L. 332, 354-55 (1968). There has been, however, some departure from this
fact characterization of foreign law. Id. at 355. See generally Imre Zajtay, Zur Stellung des
Auslndischen Rechts im Franzisischen Internationalen Privatrecht 136-44 (1963). Henri
Batiffol, the distinguished French conflicts scholar, has opposed this trend. Henri Batiffol,
Droit International Priv6 374 (4th ed. 1967).
204. Elliot v. Joicey, [1935] A.C. 209, 236. See also Scoles & Hay, supra note 5, at 406 n.2.
205. See generally Sass, supra note 203, at 356-71. Not all civil law countries have taken
this approach, notably Spain, Greece, Turkey, and certain Swiss cantons. Many Latin
American countries also regard the matter as one of fact. The prototype has been the
Argentine Civil Code of 1869, which provides in relevant part in article 13: "The application of
foreign law ...shall never take place except at the instance of the interested party, upon whom
shall be the burden of proving the existence of these laws ....
"
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the evidentiary rules for determining foreign law are not as
restrictive as in the common law and judges are more active, despite the statutory prohibition
quoted above. Also, several countries, such as Argentina, have entered into the Montevideo
Treaties of 1889 and 1940 or adopted the Bustamente Code of 1928, which provide for ex
officio application of foreign law with respect solely to matters involving countries party to
these regional treaties. Sass, supra, at 353. In some of the other countries mentioned above,
the courts have taken an ambivalent approach in practice and often actively inject themselves
into the process. See id. at 353 nn. 68 & 69. Note should also be taken of the European
Convention on Information on Foreign Law, Europ. T.S. No. 62 (1968), which establishes a
mechanism for obtaining responses from another country as to its law. However, the response
received is not binding on the judicial authority making the request. Id. art. 8.
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sion that "foreign law" would actually be applied would be a selfdeception. As the distinguished private international law scholar
Otto Kahn-Freund has stated, in commenting on the proof of law
issue: "Are we not deluding ourselves in thinking that international
harmony, however desirable, can ever be more than an ideal to be
approached as close as possible, but never fully to be translated into
6
reality?

20

Kahn-Freund goes on to address a number of perplexing problems
in connection with proof of foreign law.207 For example, there is the
"inter-temporal" issue of at what point in time the foreign law is
determined. Political changes have redrawn national boundaries.
Does the sovereign law in force at the time a will was executed or at
the time of death apply, regardless of whether the sovereign is different? Even if the geographic contact of the individual is not affected,
are ethnic, racial, cultural, or other affiliations relevant? These questions are particularly pertinent when contact points such as habitual
residence and nationality are determinative of governing law.
A second problem area relates to the authority of judicial precedent. 20 8 The issue is especially noteworthy when distinct judicial systems, such as common and civil, are involved. In common law
courts, the judge "makes" the law as he or she decides the case; precedent is valued. In civil law countries, this is not true to the same
extent. In light of this, should a common law judge rely on civil law
precedent or, instead, as a civilian judge might do, resort to the views
of scholars, who often occupy nearly as influential a role in setting the
course of future decision-making?109 The question suggests the far
more delicate issue of how a judge from any one society, with a particular education and conception of his other role, can ever replicate the
decision of a judge from another society. 10 Further, the authority to
be given decisions of lesser foreign courts and agencies, and validity of
206. Kahn-Freund, supra note 127, at 440.
207. Id.
208. Id. See also Shapira, supra note 69, at 144-45.
209. See Kahn-Freund, supra note 127, at 446-49. See also Shapira, supra note 69, at 144.
210. Even on the American domestic legal scene, much has been written in this regard. For
example, there has been widespread recognition that judges bring their own predilections and
values into the decision-making process. This view prevails in schools of thought such as
critical legal studies and feminist legal theory. Additionally, the proper approach to the
interpretation of statutes and the materials to be utilized in undertaking an inquiry into the law
are currently being vigorously debated and no broadly accepted methodology exists. See, e.g.,
Symposium, A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, - Vand. L Rev. (to be published Mar. 1992); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory
Interpretation, 78 Geo. LJ. 353 (1989); T. Alexander Aldnikoff, Updating Statutory
Interpretation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 20 (1988). If there is no consensus in this country, how can a
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law under a foreign constitution, are unavoidable issues raising severe
doubts as to the possibility
of obtaining anything more than a hazy
image of foreign law.2" If there cannot be replication of foreign
law,
the question must be asked: why not just apply forum law? This rhetorical thrust is most compelling when, as with the Convention, the
forum is the situs and begins with a strong physical, historical, and
political link with the property, even if its overall interests may not be
as pronounced as those of the foreign jurisdiction whose law ought to
be applied. Why not simply apply the law of one interested state that
can be determined more definitely and more efficiently, rather than
look to another state whose law can never truly be captured?" 2
Of course, the Convention could have avoided these problems, as
well as several others, by taking a different tack. For example, it
might have provided for a certification or declaratory order from the
relevant jurisdiction as to the foreign law. Much delay, cost, and controversy could have been avoided in this manner, and a closer approximation, albeit not precise replication, of the foreign law could have
been achieved. 2 3
2. Renvoi
The striking failure of the Convention even to address the complex
issue of proof of foreign law is magnified by the treatment it gives the
renvoi question. Renvoi has received more than its fair share of comment.2 4 The debate will not be replayed here. Rather, the shortcomings of the Convention's approach, as set forth in article 17, will
foreign judge be expected to make a sound judgment or even to understand the ongoing
debate?

211. See generally Kahn-Freund, supra note 127, 446-51. See also Miller, supra note 173,
raising the spectre of a forum court having to exercise continuing jurisdiction over an estate
pursuant to a foreign applicable law.
212. See Shapira, supra note 70, at 160-61, recognizing the problem and urging an approach
that "always starts from the premise that the lexfori is prima facie applicable." Id. at 161.
This premise affords assurance to parties and counsel that domestic standards will be invoked
unless a different pattern is affirmatively established. Shapira and other interests analysts
sensibly eliminate the "baffling problems traditionally subsumed under the heading 'pleading
and proof of foreign law' [which] are inevitable by-products of a doctrine postulating the
imperative governance of territorially designated laws." Id. at 160. Instead, the party urging
application of foreign law "must come up with a convincing showing of a paramount interest
claimed by a foreign jurisdiction." Id. at 161.
213. In this regard, see the discussion of potential prototypes in the form of the British Law
Ascertainment Act and The European Convention on Information on Foreign Law, supra
notes 202 and 205.

214. See Kahn-Freund, supra note 127, at 431, 458 n.62. See generally Leflar, supra note
46, § 7, at 11-13; Scoles & Hay, supra note 5, §§ 3.13, 3.14, for a thorough discussion and
citation of numerous other authorities.
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briefly be examined. That provision, following the models of the Italian Civil Code 5 and earlier Hague Conventions, 21 6 regards the reference by the forum to another country's law as a reference to its
internal law, and not "whole" law.
The theory represented by this approach has been the subject of
criticism. 2 17 While it may tend to simplify the inquiry, 218 it does so at

a high price. Specifically, application of the internal law of the habitual residence or the nationality country creates a tidy but artificial
result that does not reflect the true law of the habitual residence or
nationality country, except when such countries also reject renvoi.
Consequently, the outcomes reached under the Convention are no
more compelling and certainly less the law of any "connected" jurisdiction than when the situs applies its own law as the forum.21 9
Admittedly, renvoi might justifiably be cast aside if the choice of
215. Ch. H, art. 30. See also Greek Civil Code of 1940, art 32; United Kingdom Wills Act,
§§ 1, 2, 1963, c. 44.
216. E.g., Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents, 1971, art. 3; see
also Benelux Uniform Law relating to Private International Law, art. 11, reprinted in 18 Am.
J. Comp. L. 424 (1970).

217. See, e.g., Leflar, supra note 46, at 13; Scoles & Hay, supra note 5, at 68-69. See also
Erwin N. Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv. L Rev. 1165, 1182 (1938).
218. See Leflar, supra note 46, at 11-12.
219. Despite the general reluctance of American courts to employ renvoi, there are two
noteworthy exceptions--cases involving transfers of real property and matters involving
succession to both real and personal property. See Restatement (Second), supra note 14,
§§ 223, 260, 263. See generally Leflar, supra note 46, at 475-76 (with respect to land cases).
Leflar seems disposed to an escape from renvoi through application of the internal law of the
relevant jurisdiction when simplification of the court's task is the predominant concern.
However, he recognizes that when uniformity in title holdings is the primary objective, as with
land title cases, renvoi is necessary. By its use, the nonsitus state approximates the result that
the situs state, which controls the property, would reach. Id. at 12.
Concern for simplification of the judicial task tends to produce a negative attitude towards
renvoi because of the circularity problem that may arise if the whole law of the relevant
country makes a reference or remission to the forum. This concern, however, may be
overstated. First, the relevant country may not remit to the forum, but rather look to the law
of a third country. Second, the forum may not employ renvoL. Thus, if there is a remission to
it, the forum's own internal law will be applied, without a further look to the law of the other
country. For an excellent discussion of the problem, see Wolff, supra note 22, at 199-204. See
also Scoles & Hay, supra note 5, at 69. Suppose, however, the "vicious circle" has to be
confronted because both countries apply renvoL A common solution has been that of the
English courts, in which the forum court steps into the shoes of the foreign court and applies
its rule. This "foreign court theory" has the effect of a concession by the forum of its own
renvoi rule, but it eliminates the circularity problem. See In Re Annesley [1926] Ch. 692. See
generally Kahn-Freund, supra note 127, at 433-34. While appearing expedient, this result can
be rationalized. Most notably, the reference back under the foreign country's law indicates a
disinterest on the part of that country in having its law applied over that of the forum. Scoles
& Hay, supra note 5, at 69-70.
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law process employed were some sort of interests analysis. 220 The
Convention, however, does not take this approach. Renvoi, with all
its flaws, assists, at least indirectly, in coming closer to the true law of
the designated country when contact points are utilized rather than
an interests analysis. However, by artificially restricting the inquiry
to the internal law of a country, the Convention is self-defeating. The
law chosen is not, and can hardly claim to be in many cases the "law"
of the designated jurisdiction under the Convention. The artificial
law applied certainly lacks the authority and germaneness of the
forum's own law.
3.

The Incidental Question

A final matter unaddressed by the Convention, but of considerable
significance, is the issue of the incidental question. 22 1 Because each
forum can determine what is an issue of succession,2 22 certain coun-

tries may choose to adopt a single approach with respect to inheritance and status matters. Other countries might not do so. This
situation will, as in the case of proof of foreign law and renvoi, have
the consequence of defeating the very uniformity sought in the disposition of the estate. Consider one example: The decedent dies an
habitual resident of England, with assets in that jurisdiction and in
France. He was married to his niece. Assume under German law,
the country of his nationality, as well as under French law, marriages
involving this relationship are not permitted, but they are permitted
under the law of England. The decedent dies without a will. Suppose
the Convention requires application of the law of habitual residence.
220. Were an interests analysis approach to be undertaken, there would be no need for
renvoi. Rather, the question would be which state had the predominant interest in having its
local law applied. Indeed, while there may be legitimate "transnational" concerns implicated
that might override a balancing of parochial interests, they have not been carefully developed
to date. Certainly, the choice of law rules of particular countries are not at this point shaped to
advance these "transnational" interests, and are more nearly dictated by over-generalized
theories of contact points, territorial sovereignty, efficiency of application, predictability, and
uniformity. See Shapira, supra note 69, at 140-41. Some commentators have recognized a
role for renvoi in the event of a transition period to a purer and less chauvinistic interests
analysis. See Arthur T. von Mehren, The Renvoi and its Relation to Various Approaches to
the Choice-of-Law Problem, in XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law 380, 393-94
(1961). See also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 72, at 551-52; Comment, Conflict of
Laws-Two Case Studies in Governmental-Interest Analysis, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1448, 1454
(1965). At present, however, "a functional analysis probably best proceeds without assigning
decisive importance to the choice-of-law rules of the other jurisdictions concerned." Von
Mehren, supra, Renvoi at 391. See also Cavers, supra note 89, at 106. But see Weintraub,
supra note 8,at 577-78.
221. See generally Wolff, supra note 22, at 206-11; Kahn-Freund, supra note 127, at 437-40.
222. See supra note 29.
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The spouse will take an elective share under English law if the validity
of the marriage is regarded as governed by the succession law. Such
an approach by the French forum arguably favors international harmony.' On the other hand, if France regards marriage as a distinct
issue not incidental to the succession then it will apply its own choice
of law rule relating to marriage. Assuming this is a nationality rule,
the marriage will be invalid, as determined by German law. The same
would be true if the French forum applied its own ordre public.224
Accordingly, the assets will not be distributed in the same manner as
will assets of the decedent that are located in England. In the latter
case, the spouse will be awarded her elective share. The consequence
of a "scission" of these choice of law matters, then, is the frustration
of the unitary treatment of the estate. Thus, despite its goal of a single
law governing the disposition of the estate, the Convention fails to
address the recurring problem of the incidental question that is likely
to yield the very lack of uniformity the Convention seeks to eliminate.
H. The Scope of the Convention-The Meaning of "Solely,"
"Succession," and "Conflicts"
One of the most troubling aspects of the Convention is its failure to
define its own scope. The Convention has been billed as purely applicable to "international" estates. 22s This limitation is critical for proponents of the Convention, because any extension of the Convention's
uniform and novel choice of law rules to purely multistate conflicts
would likely be viewed as an unwarranted intrusion into areas of
"domestic" law traditionally left to the states. 26
Uncertainty about the scope of the Convention could also generate
substantially increased probate litigation. Estates would be tied up as
litigants disputed whether the novel rules set forth in the Convention
223. See Wolff, supra note 22, at 208-09. Of course, the price ofsuch international harmony
is dissonance in domestic law. That is, certain marriages will be recognized for some purposes,
but not for other purposes. This is precisely what has happened in certain American cases.
E.g., In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1948) (two Indian wives
entitled to share in husband's estate).
224. See infra text accompanying note 255.
225. See Report, supra note 13, cl. 131, at 601. See also Scoles, supra note 24, at 11.
226. Indeed, Professor Scoles, the American representative to the Hague Conference, noted
in his memorandum to the American Bar Association that "[s]ince the United States is a
federal nation, this distinction between interstate and international cases is appropriate."
Scoles, supra note 24, at 11. For a discussion of the different approaches to choice of law in the

interstate and international contexts, see, e.g., Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Interstate and
International Conflicts Law: A Plea for Segregation, 41 Minn. L Rev. 717 (1957); Peter Hay,
International Versus Interstate Conflicts Law in the United States, 35 Rabels Zeitschrift 429,
471-77, 485 (1971).
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or the forum state's traditional choice of law rules applied. To the
extent the Convention was found to apply, its more complex factual
inquiry compelled by the Convention's law-determinative connectors
would slow down probate and increase its costs.
Despite the foregoing, the fact is that there is no way of discerning
from the Convention what its limits are. Article 1(1) simply states
that the "Convention determines the law applicable to succession to
the estates of deceased persons." It does not speak in terms of persons
having contacts with, or property in, more than one country.2 2 7 The
Report also fails to take note of any such limitation. Articles 3, 4, and
5 of the Convention set forth choice of law rules, indicating which
jurisdiction's law is to apply, based on the contacts of the individual.
However, there is no indication when these choice of law rules, as
opposed to the ones currently in force in the various American states,
come into play.
In fact, one provision does appear to prevent the wholesale application of the Convention to purely interstate conflicts, but it does so in a
most indirect and unsuccessful manner. Article 21 states that "[a]
Contracting State in which different systems of law or sets of rules of
law apply to succession shall not be bound to apply the rules of the
Convention to conflicts solely between the laws of such different systems or sets of rules of law."
The foregoing makes clear that the United States would not have to
apply the Convention in the purely multistate context, but leaves
unclear whether it must manifest its decision not to do so. For example, would the United States be required to make a formal declaration
to the depositary nation? Could the decision be made by local courts
on a case-by-case method? On the other hand, could these courts
choose to apply the Convention to purely interstate conflicts? While
they are not bound to do so, they are also not prohibited from doing
8
22

SO.

227. The American representative views the Convention as being limited to the following
categories:
succession of property at the death of United States citizens who die while living
abroad for an extended time for business, personal or retirement reasons; and of
United States citizens who, while remaining in the United States own assets abroad;
or of former United States citizens who emigrate. It also concerns citizens of other
countries who come to the United States to live for extended periods or to immigrate
as well as foreigners who only own assets in the United States.
See Scoles, supra note 24, at 11. Nothing in the Convention supports this type of limitation;
nor does the Report.
228. But see Report, supra note 13, cl. 131, at 601, which indicates that purely interstate
conflicts are "beyond the reach of the Convention." This comment suggests that the
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Assuming that purely domestic conflicts could be exempted from
the Convention as part of the ratification process or are automatically
exempted by the Convention itself, there is the more fundamental
problem raised by article 21 of what is an "international" conflict.
Under article 21, a federal state such as the United States is not bound
to apply the convention "to conflicts solely between the laws of such
different systems or sets of rules of law."' 29 The use of the term
"solely" indicates that any conflict that implicates laws of jurisdictions beyond the borders of the United States is within the scope of
the Convention. As a result, the identification of the jurisdictions
privy to the conflict is vital. In every probate matter, a determination
will have to be made whether there is a conflict "solely" between the
states in order to determine whether the Convention applies.
In ascertaining whether there are solely interstate conflicts, one first
has to know what a "conflict" is. After an initial failure to address
the question in the Preliminary Report, the Report attempts to
answer the question. Its response is quite troubling. For example, "if
the assets of the deceased's estate are in state P, save for one asset
which is in state Q, the Convention applies ... ."230 In this case, the
Convention would apply to succession to the entire estate of the decedent and not just to the single foreign asset. One problem with this
approach is that it puts new emphasis on the metaphysical search for
the situs of assets.231 Since much wealth is owned in intangible form,
disputes will increase as to the situs of various intangibles. Furthermore, choice of law issues will arise and have to be addressed regarding which country's situs-identification rules prevail. For a
Convention that uniformly repudiates the interests of the situs jurisdiction and its choice of law rules, this new focus on situs represents a
rather ironic and disturbing twist.
Another problem with the delineation of the Convention's scope is
that many Americans who have predominantly domestic estates may
inadvertently find their estates "internationalized" by the ownership
at death of a single asset of minimal value having a foreign situs.
There will be no way to plan for this eventuality, especially if the
individual's portfolio is constantly changing. Even in the unlikely sceConvention would not apply to such conflicts, and that as a matter of internal law the United
States would have to legislate the Convention's application to interstate conflicts.
229. Emphasis added.
230. Report, supra note 13, cl. 131, at 603. The reference to "state" here is intended to
mean foreign country.
231. See 1 Schoenblum, supra note 44, § 16.07 & 2 Schoenblum, supra note 51, §§ 19.05 &
20.05, for a consideration of the difficulties in pinpointing the situs of assets.
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nario of a static portfolio, events beyond the testator's control, such as
the merger of a domestic corporation into a foreign entity, might
bring the Convention into play. The acquisition of a foreign obligation for charitable purposes, such as an Israeli Bond, could convert an
owner's entire estate into an international estate. The idea that the
relevance of the Convention will be determined by such a haphazard
and shifting test is quite troubling and raises serious concerns about
fairness and respect for fulfillment of the expectations of testators
within this country.
Instead, the Convention might have set forth an explicit delineation
of what constitutes an international conflict. For example, only those
particular assets deemed by the forum to have a foreign situs might
have been subjected to the Convention. In this way, at least the existence of a "foreign" asset would not have implicated the entire estate.
The domicile or situs state theoretically would have preserved its own
choice of law rules with respect to wholly domestic assets, while the
Convention retained its entirely "international" character.232
From the language of the Report, the term "solely," as used in article 21, is to be taken quite literally, so that it "must surely mean that
no foreign jurisdiction is involved at all in the whole fact situation,
save perhaps for a fact or facts that have no legal significance or do
not fall as to subject-matter within article 7(1) or 7(2). 1233 The foregoing language emphasizes another controversial issue in identifying
the conflicts within the scope of the Convention-that is, the conflict
must pass a subject matter test involving "succession." Articles 7(1)
and 7(2) describe the topics to which the choice of law provisions of
articles 3 and 5 apply.2 34 At one point, the Report indicates that
"succession issues" involving more than one country constitute a relevant conflict and thereby internationalize the entire estate. 235 The
meaning of "succession" is left to the forum to determine under the
Convention. 236 At another point, however, the Report appears to
contradict the foregoing position. Significantly, it emphasizes that the
fact that a family member is asserting rights under a forced share law
does not internationalize the conflict; the Report explicitly states that
232. Of course, many assets are truly of mixed character. The Convention's applicability
should not turn on fanciful and wholly abstract conclusions as to the national character of an
asset.
233. Report, supra note 13, cl.
131, at 603.
234. See supra notes 29 and 56.
235. See supra note 29.
236. See Report, supra note 13, cl.24 at 535. At a minimum, succession includes the
matters listed in article 7(2). Beyond this, the forum is given freedom to make its own
determination as to the scope of the term and, accordingly, the coverage of the Convention.
HeinOnline -- 32 Va. J. Int'l L. 140 1991-1992

1991]

DECEDENTS' ESTATES

this is not a matter of "succession." 37 This conclusion is puzzling,
because enforcement of forced heirship rights is a prime objective of
the Convention23 and appears to be within the subject matter of article 7(2). The Report, however, offers the following example: "Where
all the assets and the [decedent] and his close family are in state P, but
one child is in state Q, that child may have forced share rights under
the law of state Q, but that is of no consequence because the 'succession' is totally contained in state P. The matter is not
international."' 39
This example is patently incorrect. If a child is not part of the decedent's "close family," who is? Certainly, by any standard of contemporary interests analysis, the conflict is "international" in that the
laws of several jurisdictions with some interest in the issue may differ
on the rights of a child to inherit property or to interfere with the
rights of others to inherit. This would seem precisely the sort of situation the Convention, in light of its objective of family protection,
would seek to address.
In addition to "solely" and "succession," the term "conflict" itself
must be given meaning before the scope of the Convention can be
fully understood. Because "conflict" is not defined in the Convention,
and the Report only creates confusion on the matter, a consideration
of the basic premises underlying conflicts theory ought to be
considered.
In the broadest sense, a conflict exists whenever an issue having
multijurisdictional contacts is raised. 24 Nevertheless, some conflicts
scholars would exclude from this the notion of "false conflicts." Proponents of the Currie school of governmental interests analysis may
argue that no determination as to whether a conflict exists at all can
be made until an analysis of the interests and policies of potentially
interested jurisdictions is completed. Thus, if the person or matter at
issue has contacts with more than one country, the interests of these
237. See Report, supra note 13, cl. 131, at 603.

238. See supra text accompanying notes 145-147.
239. Report, supra note 13, cl. 131, at 603.
240. See, e.g., Leflar, supra note 46, at 3 ("Any case whose facts relate to more than one
state or nation, so that in deciding the case it is necessary to make a choice between the
relevant laws of the different states or countries, is a conflicts case."); Ehrenzweig, supra note
148, at 1 ("The law of Conflict of Laws is usually described, though not defined, as the body of
rules dealing with the effect of foreign 'contacts' on the decision of a civil case. When will a
court in the United States apply the law of a sister state or of a foreign country? /hen may it
do so, when must it do so? These are the problems of Choice of Law."). See also Weintraub,
supra note 8, at 1 (a conflict exists when "the elements of the problem have contacts with more
than one jurisdiction"); Restatement (Second), supra note 14, § 2.
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countries would have to be considered. If one country has a dominant interest, despite formal contacts by another country, there is a
"false" conflict. A false conflict
is, fundamentally, equivalent to the
241
existence of no conflict at all.
In fact, as many present day Currie adherents would acknowledge,2 42 there is a difference between saying that one jurisdiction's
interest is predominant and saying that no conflict exists. 243 From a
practical standpoint, it might be argued that a conflict exists whenever
it is alleged. Even when the forum decides that a particular contact of
another jurisdiction with the matter is of minimal significance, it is
actually deciding the conflict. The conflict arises when a party to the
proceeding asserts that the law of some jurisdiction other than the
forum's own law should be determinative. Assuming that the allegations are not entirely specious, the fact that a particular contact of one
jurisdiction was not accorded the weight of the contact of another
jurisdiction whose law is ultimately applied does not mean there was
no conflict, but rather that the conflict has been resolved in favor of
the latter jurisdiction.2 "
241. See Leflar, supra note 46, at 271, describing this position and then dismissing it. The
authors state: "An interpretation of the term which implies that no choice-of-law problem is
present in any 'false conflicts' case creates difficulty when differences of opinion arise as to
whether a given state does have a 'governmental interest' in the facts." Id. at 271 n.1.
Furthermore, the authors emphasize:
The fact that the relevant choice-influencing considerations, including
governmental interests, largely favor one state rather than another does not mean
that there is no choice-of-law problem in the case. When an event or transaction has
contacts with two or more states whose laws are different, and each state's contacts
are sufficient under the Federal Constitution to permit its law to be applied, a real
(not a false) choice-of-law problem is presented. It may be that the court's basis for
choice between the differing state laws will make the choice an easy one.
Id. at 271 (footnote omitted). See also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 72, at 76 (indicating that a conflict of law arises any time that multiple jurisdictions have "expressed some
interest in regulating an aspect of the multistate transaction"). Moreover, these authors warn
that similarities or differences in the domestic policies of diverse states may not be reflected in
their approach in the multijurisdictional context. Id. at 76-77. Thus, facile comparisons of
laws or policies may not reveal the existence of true conflicts.
242. See, e.g., Weintraub, supra note 8, at 1.
243. Id. Ely, not a Currie adherent, in his oft-noted article, Choice of Law and the State's
Interest in Protecting its Own, supra note 70, seeks to debunk the whole concept of false
conflicts as resting on an unjustified forum bias for its own citizens. In his view, once this
chauvinism is delegitimized as a proper approach, "most of what appear on the surface to be
conflicts of law are just that, and cannot be dissolved either with or without the premise that
states are unusually interested in helping their own." Id. at 179 (emphasis in original). But see
Singer, supra note 180, at 65-74, criticizing Ely's overall analysis.
244. In many instances, the Convention could easily be manipulated. Minimal, but real,
international contacts could be alleged in order to bring the Convention into play and change
the choice of law rule in overwhelmingly interstate conflicts cases. See also Larry Kramer,
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A further aspect of the conflicts problem arises when there are no
palpable differences existing in the laws of the relevant states. In this
situation, there is no real dispute. But is there a conflict? A number
of commentators have argued that the choice of law analysis must still
be undertaken even though the internal laws of the jurisdictions are
the same, since each state may have different multijurisdictional policies or interests or there may be a "supernational" outcome that
ought to be reached. 245
The determination of whether there is a conflict offers other opportunities for manipulation. Professor Westen has argued that the
attempt to postpone conflicts analysis until the truly interested states
have been identified is misplaced, because there will be much potential
for bias and widespread disagreement as to which states are truly
interested. 2' For example, even when two states are interested, the
law of one may be construed narrowly by the forum, so as to make it
inapplicable to the particular multistate case. Commentators, however, have disagreed as to whether these apparent conflicts should be
treated like false conflicts and equated with a no conflict situation. 247
Depeqage 2 " might also serve as a technique for neutralizing conflicts.
If issues are sufficiently fractionalized, there may be only one state
with a predominant interest in having its law applied to each discrete
issue.2 4 9 As a result, there may not be conflicts under this approach.

Other situations also raise unresolved issues as to whether there is a
conflict. For example, a situation may arise in which neither the
forum nor any other states' interests are truly implicated. A choice of
law will have to be made nonetheless if the court has assumed jurisdiction. 250 The reception of foreign law as pure evidentiary datum is
another problematic situation. In the process, there is likely to be an
unstated, preliminary resolution of choice of law.25 1
Interests Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1301 (1989) for an

excellent consideration of how the litigation process itself determines whether there is a
conflict.
245. See, e.g., Luther L. McDougal III, Toward Application of the Best Rule of Law in
Choice of Law Cases, 35 Mercer L. Rev. 483, 496 (1984). See also Peter K Westen,
Comment, False Conflicts, 55 Cal. L. Rev. 74, 107-08 (1967) for a superb inquiry into this and
related issues. See generally von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 72, at 76; supra note 241.
246. Westen, supra note 245, at 81-84.
247. Id. at 90.
248. See supra note 143.
249. See Westen, supra note 245, at 96.
250. Id. at 104. See also Currie, supra note 66, at 774-79; von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 72, at 407-08.
251. See Westen, supra note 245, at 116-20. See also supra text accompanying notes 201,
205-06.
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The question of whether there is a conflict and, thus, whether the
Convention is to apply, will undoubtably generate substantial controversy. This issue invokes a most fundamental, unsettled debate
among conflicts scholars.252 From a planning standpoint, especially
on the interstate level, the task will prove unjustifiably frustrating,
because there will be little certainty as to the Convention's impact.
On the international plane, forums will have vast discretion, through
their definition of "conflict," for delimiting the applicability of the
Convention locally. Once again, it is apparent that, while the Convention strives for uniformity, considerable lack of uniformity,
manipulation, and forum-shopping will be the order of the day.
Even if the parameters of "conflict" could be drawn with precision
so that article 21 would have a clear meaning, the premise underlying
this provision poses a severe political problem likely to foster nonobservance through various escape devices. The premise requires a foreign jurist thousands of miles away to apply the law of an American
state because an international conflict is involved, while a judge of a
sister American state will not have to follow suit, inasmuch as an
interstate conflict is involved.253 This sort of outcome over time is
likely to breed cynicism on the part of the foreign signatories to the
Convention and their jurists, who may not feel especially obliged to
enforce faithfully the Convention, when their American brethren and
those of other federal nations, are able to ignore it in the context of
the identical estate.2 54 It may also breed cynicism at home. Suppose
two lifetime habitual residents of Kentucky own land in Tennessee.
One also owns a dollar's worth of foreign currency. The disposition
of Tennessee land of one Kentuckian will be governed by Tennessee
law, while the Tennessee land of the other Kentuckian will be governed by Kentucky law, as a result of the Convention's applicability.
252. See, e.g., supra notes 241-43. Even articles by distinguished individual conflicts
scholars may suggest an anmbivalence on this point. See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, A
Method for Solving Conflict Problems, 21 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 573, 574, 577 (1960) (at one point
describing the "classic" conflicts problem as one in which two states having "contacts" with
the parties or occurrences would reach different outcomes; at another point, explaining that
there will be "no conflict" when a thorough analysis reveals that "one of the domestic rules is
not rationally applicable .. "). Id. at 577. Compare Leflar, supra note 46 ("conflict" where
there are multistate contacts) with Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,
91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 267, 290 (1960) (if the laws would produce the same result, "there is no real
conflict of laws at all").
253. See supra text accompanying note 226.
254. The difference in treatment between choice of law issues at the interstate and
international level has been explored in a number of articles. The most notable are
Ehrenzweig, supra note 226, and Hay, supra note 226.
HeinOnline -- 32 Va. J. Int'l L. 144 1991-1992

1991]

I.

DECEDENTS' ESTATES

The Convention's Public Policy Exceptions-Self-Defeating
Escape Mechanisms

Article 18 of the Convention provides that the Convention's choice
of law rules "may be refused only where such application would be
manifestly incompatible with public policy (ordre public)." On the
surface, this public policy exception might appear a severely limited
escape device, especially in light of the logic of the Convention, the
use of the word "manifestly" in article 18, and the hostile jurisprudence that has developed in connection with the public policy
exception.
Commencing with the last of these factors, for more than a half
century American courts have grappled with the theory and application of the public policy exception. At one point, any statute of one
jurisdiction that was "substantially" dissimilar to the forum's own
law was rejected as contrary to local public policy. In Loucks v. Standard Oil Company, Judge Cardozo sought to repudiate this rule, stating that "[w]e are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a
problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home." 2 "5 His
view appears to have prevailed. 2 6
Nevertheless, each state is the final judge of its own public policy
and what offends it."' If certain foreign laws are excluded by local
courts on the ground that they violate public policy, there is little that
typically can be done.25 8 This represents the central irony of the public policy exception-any choice of law problem inevitably implicates
a foreign rule that does not conform precisely to local standards. The
greater the divergence in laws, the greater the need for an impartial
choice of law. Precisely in this situation, however, there is more of an
inclination to ignore choice of law and invoke the public policy
259
exception.
255. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (1918). Following Cardozo's departure
from the New York Court of Appeals, that court reverted to a totally parochial approach in
Mertz v. Mertz, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936). As has been noted by Professor Weintraub, Judge
Lehman's "definition of public policy [in Mertz] was so parochial that, if applied literally, all
conflicts analysis would be ended." Weintraub, supra note 8,at 82.
256. See generally Leflar, supra note 46, at 144-45.
257. See id. at 145.
258. See, e.g., Sedler, supra note 5, at 18-20. On the other hand, the "public policy
technique" ought not foreclose the bringing of the suit elsewhere, since a dismissal on this
ground is not on the merits.
259. For Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33
Yale L.J. 736, 747 (1924), the public policy doctrine demonstrated "that there was something
the matter with the reasoning upon which the rules to which it is the exception were supposed
to be based." Thus, in cases where there are essentially rigid choice of law rules, such as those
HeinOnline -- 32 Va. J. Int'l L. 145 1991-1992

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32:83

Undoubtedly there are extreme or outrageous extrastate laws that
are simply too intolerable by local standards to be applied. This
should rarely occur in the interstate context, since the legal rules and
culture are similar, if not identical, throughout the United States.2"
With respect to the Convention, the matter is not so clear. 26 1 There is
enormous diversity from one country to another as to succession laws.
Thus, forum courts in the United States might seek to opt out of the
Convention by invoking article 18. In these cases, the Supreme Court
would have a vital role to play in defining the bounds of the public
policy exception.262 In doing so, however, the Court would be inquirset forth in the Convention or as are currently followed in most states with respect to
succession, he asked:
Is it not strange to argue in the first place that state A has no choice in accepting the
original rule and then to admit that it has the power to set aside the effect of that rule
whenever it pleases on the plea that such recognition or enforcement would violate
its public policy?
Id. Taking up this theme, Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, in "Public Policy" in the
Conflict of Laws, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 969, 1016 (1956), criticized the public policy technique as
an evasive method that allows courts to avoid addressing head-on in a dispassionate manner
whether the forum's interest in the case is so strong that it, in fact, overrides the otherwise
indicated application of foreign law. See also David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-ofLaw Problem, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173, 183-84 (1933).
260. See, e.g., Weintraub, supra note 8, at 463, 438-39 (urging recognition of the law that
favors validity in succession to decedents' estates, thereby effectuating the shared value of
carrying out the testator's testamentary intent).
261. This potential interstate-international distinction was recognized by the distinguished
conflicts scholar, Judge Herbert F. Goodrich. In his article, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies,
25 Va. L. Rev. 26, 35 (1938), he wrote:
As among our states, the sight of the courts of one state refusing to apply the law of
another because the second state's rule shocks the morals of the forum, is one to
make the judicious grieve. . . . A mutual tolerance for each other's little
idiosyncracies does not seem a great deal to ask from members of a family of states
which have so much in common as we have. Such mutual tolerance is all that is
necessary in order to get rid of the public policy argument altogether in Conflict of
Laws among the states of this ountry ....As among ourselves and foreign nations,
the case is not so strong.
262. The Supreme Court in the past has focused principally on the constitutional limits to a
state's invocation of public policy in order to avoid providing a forum for a cause of action
recognized by another state. Although there is ambivalent language in the key case of Hughes
v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951), that case can be read as holding that there is no absolute defense
of public policy. In Hughes, Wisconsin refused, in accordance with its laws, to permit a cause
of action for wrongful death based on an Illinois statute. The Court stated that the "strong
unifying principle embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause looking toward maximum
enforcement in each state of the obligations or rights created or recognized by the statutes of
sister states" required Wisconsin to recognize the cause of action. Id. at 612. Later, however,
the Court suggested that its language meant little more than that sister state causes of action, if
similar to those recognized locally, could not be the subject of discrimination. Wells v.
Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 518-19 (1953). Indeed, in diversity cases, the Supreme
Court has long recognized the validity of the public policy argument. See, e.g., Bond v. Hume,
243 U.S. 15, 21 (1917) (where enforcement of the foreign law would be "repugnant to good
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ing as to whether the applicable choice of law under the Convention
was manifestly incompatible with forum state law. 263 That is, in order
to enforce federal law-the Convention-the Court would be required
to serve as the ultimate arbiter of the local state's own public policy.
Is the Court capable of properly performing this function? Ought the
Court to assume the posture of second-guessing local values, especially if the state's own high court has spoken to the contrary? On the
other hand, if the Court abstains, will unrestrained state courts accord
article 18 undue influence, and thereby subvert the Convention?2 "
One potential restraint on this last possibility might appear to be
morals, would lead to disturbance and disorganization of the local municipal law, or in other
words, violate the public policy of the State where the enforcement of the foreign contract is
sought"). See also Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932) (where
enforcement of the law "would be obnoxious to the public policy of the forum"). See generally
Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 259, at 1012-15.
263. The principle that a federal court should apply the public policy doctrine of the state in
which it sits in diversity cases was set forth in Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941),
consistent with the Erie doctrine. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1937). Thus,
to the extent the approach of the state is otherwise constitutional, see supra note 262, the
federal courts are not to create their own choice-influencing principles. Cf. Day &
Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (per curiam). The Griffin case was
remanded to determine local Texas law. On remand, the federal court of appeals eventually
held that Texas public policy would be violated if an assignee without an insurable interest
were allowed to collect on a "New York" insurance policy. Griffin v. McCoach, 123 F.2d 550
(5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 683 (1942).
264. Of course, federal courts have long had to apply state law and, in so doing, determine
what that law is. See 19 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4507
(1982 & 1991 Supp.) for a compendium of cases dealing with the numerous legal issues
associated with this process of discovering state law. Significantly, however, the public policy
issue would prove even stickier, since the inquiry would likely have to go beyond the statutes
and case law of the forum, and involve an exploration of the moral and social standards of the
community. One response to the foregoing difficulties is that the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts might fashion their own nationwide standard as to when the Convention's
outcomes would be unacceptable. One can argue that the policies of the states are sufficiently
consistent to justify this approach. See supra text accompanying note 260. Furthermore,
when federal questions have served as the basis for federal court jurisdiction, many courts have
ignored the diversity-case rule. Instead, not being bound by Erie, see supra note 263, and
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), they have invoked a federal
common law of conflicts. See, e.g., Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 861 F.2d 1291, 1294
(1st Cir. 1988); Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1987). But see,
e.g., Elmas Trading Corp., 683 F. Supp. 743 (D. Nev. 1987) (holding that state choice of law
ought to be applied to cases founded on federal question jurisdiction where state law controls
the issue to be decided). See generally Note, Applicability of State Conflicts Rules When
Issues of State Law Arise in Federal Question Cases, 68 Harv. L Rev. 1212, 1227-29 (1955).
Despite this idea of a federal public policy exception under article 18 of the Convention, the
Report, supra note 13, cl. 121, at 593, makes clear that the forum may "apply its own public
policy considerations ....
Because succession issues typically arise initially when state courts
probate wills, the forum will almost certainly be a state court and will have a decidedly state
outlook in defining "its own public policy considerations." Would the Supreme Court then
overturn the state court's perception of public policy or set limits on the use of the technique?
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article 18's use of the term "manifestly incompatible." The experience with the "substantially dissimilar" language utilized by American courts earlier in this century, however, suggests otherwise. In
those cases, the use of the term "substantially dissimilar" had little
effect on constraining forum courts in their invocation of the public
policy exception.265 The use of the term "manifestly incompatible"
should engender no greater respect with regard to the Convention.266
Indeed, the term is essentially redundant, since any foreign inheritance rules that are against forum public policy ought to be regarded
as "manifestly" against public policy.
While the precise impact of article 18 is unclear at this point, the
logic of the Convention certainly argues for minimal tolerance of the
provision's utilization. The Convention's very objective-to signal,
by way of uniform rules, which of any number of quite diverse systems and rules of law ought to apply to succession 267-would otherwise be further undermined. Indeed, the Convention's repudiation of
the situs rule with respect to real property could itself be regarded as
violative of traditional public policies of common law jurisdictions
that support forum control over local land.268
265. See generally Leflar, supra note 46, at 143. Intense skepticism has long persisted as to
the realistic possibility of defining or limiting the public policy doctrine. See, e.g., Lorenzen,
supra note 260, at 746-47. See also John Kosters, Public Policy in Private International Law,
29 Yale L.J. 745 (1920).
266. The Report, supra note 13, cl. 121, at 595, states that in revising article 18, there was
no intention of "encouraging States to apply public policy (ordrepublic) exceptions lightly.".
While not intended to be an exclusive list, the Report indicates that possible bases for invoking
article 18 would include "national security or political concerns to foreign ownership of
waterfront property, border lands, and utilities and other enterprises of great significance to
the economy of the jurisdiction." Id. Although apparently designed to narrow the scope of
article 18, these examples afford ample precedent to clever lawyers and judges to use the public
policy doctrine in precisely the manner criticized by many distinguished conflicts scholars-as
a doctrinal tool for widespread evasion of the choice of law rules thai would otherwise have to
be applied under the Convention. As such, it would greatly enhance unpredictability, because
there would be no certainty as to when article 18 would be successfully invoked. From an
estate planning standpoint, it would prove an entirely unhelpful doctrine. No estate, for
example, could be planned with the assurance that the forum would override the rules of the
Convention on public policy grounds. The real test of the public policy exception might come
with respect to the imposition of foreign racial, gender or religious restrictions or preferences.
See supra note 30 for a typical example. Article 18's public policy exception might have to
serve as the principal escape device from the Convention's rigidly applied rules in these
circumstances. But see Report, supra note 13, cl. 110, at 587, in which the Report condones
gender discrimination by the forum-situs state, interpreting article 15 of the Convention as
permitting a deviation from the Convention's otherwise prescribed choice of law rules on the
basis of gender preference in inheritance. Thus, Americans would not necessarily be protected
from discrimination with respect to their property situated abroad.
267. See Report, supra note 13, cl. 23, at 535; cl. 29, at 539.
268. Article 15 of the Convention appears to recognize this possibility. The Report also
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The unpredictability inherent in article 18 is exacerbated by article

-15. The latter provision affords special protection for "certain
immovables, enterprises, or other special categories of assets," where
there is a "particular inheritance regime" regarding such assets
because of "economic, family or social considerations." Again, the
precise parameters of this provision are entirely unclear,2 69 as is its
purpose in view of the public policy exception of article 18.2 °
Professor Scoles, the American representative, has publicly
acknowledged that article 15 might permit exempting broad classes of
refers to foreign ownership of various types of real property and enterprises, but apparently,
would have it governed by article 18 and not article 15. Report, supra note 13, cL 111, at 589;
cL 121, at 595. The Report does not indicate whether article 18 would support application of a
forum-situs rule barring foreign ownership of land.
269. The Report, supra note 13, cl. 113, at 591, indicates that article 15 is to apply to
"special situations where there are overriding interests at stake." Despite attempts to limit the
article's language, expansive terminology survives in the final version. For example, the
Convention can be sidestepped in order to protect an inheritance regime at the situs arising out
of "economic, family, or social considerations." Id. at 589. Recognizing the potential use of
.this language as a major escape device from the Convention's choice of law rules, the Report,
supra note 13, cl. 112, at 589, states:
[I]t
was not the intention of the Commission [drafting the Convention] that these
[considerations] should imply a wide span of potential meaning which the courts
might freely construe as a means of giving effect to what are conceived in the situs as
desirable local policies. It was the intention of the Commission that the phrase
contained here should be strictly construed, and not be regarded as an invitation to
States or courts to bring within situs control any subject having broad economic,
family or social connotations. To understand this phrase one has to return to the
fundamental concerns of the Convention itself. The Convention is concerned with
the protection of the family's indefeasible inheritance rights, with economic wealth
that affects people when that wealth passes from generation to generation, such as in
the form of small family businesses, and with social concerns such as the well-being
of groups of peoples within society. Social concerns would also be reflected in the
attempt of the estate to maintain the standards and values of society as those
elements are reflected in laws concerning inheritance and the family.
Although this statement attempts to narrow the scope of article 15, it is itself hopelessly vague
and open-ended. It demonstrates again the shortcoming of hard-and.fast choice of law rules
coupled with a public policy exception. Furthermore, it tends to convert a choice of law convention into a multilateral agreement on preferred familial and social norms. If this is what
the Convention is about, then far more rigorous exploration by experts in the relevant substantive fields of law ought to be required before ratification. See supra text accompanying notes
166-71.
270. Article 18 seems to be a more general public policy provision. The Report does not
make clear why article 15 was also needed other than to indicate that the article is an
independent conflict of law rule pertaining to succession, whereas article 18 is an exception to
the Convention's choice of law rules and would apply to concerns such as national security and
foreign ownership of certain types of property. See Report, supra note 13, cL 121, at 595. In
practice, both articles 15 and 18 appear to be little more than escape devices intended to return
to the forum and situs the autonomy otherwise deprived them by articles 3 and 5. See North,
supra note 12, for further criticism of these provisions.
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real property from the Convention.2 7 1 Indeed, the Convention's

Report gives as examples the devolution of farmland and familyowned businesses.272 It stresses that this might be in terms of the
imposition by the forum of discriminatory limits on the line of
descent 27 3 and on the fractionalization of the property.27 4 Thus, while

the Report emphasizes that broad exceptions are not intended, the
language of the Convention and the Report's own examples and
explanation strongly suggest otherwise. This is the fundamental problem with the approach of the Convention. It reflects a return to the
discredited system of rigid rules accompanied by a poorly conceived,
but potentially sweeping public policy escape device-all of which
affords neither sufficient predictability for planning nor a methodology for careful and fair consideration of the relative interests of the
various states and the system.

271. Comments of Eugene F. Scoles to Council, Real Property, Probate & Trust Law
Section of the American Bar Association, Colorado Springs, October 9, 1989. A similar
position was apparently taken by the U.S. delegation in deliberations during the drafting of the
Convention. See Report, supra note 13, cl.112, at 589. Nevertheless, efforts to narrow the
language were defeated. Id. The German experience with the situs exception to its nationality
choice of law rule suggests that deference to the situs may well occur by broad construction of
statutory language. See supra note 23.
272. For example, the Report, supra note 13, cl.110, at 587, states that "the situs may
legislate that with regard to family-owned farms at or under a given size the farm is to devolve
as one unit by way of the male line of proprietor." If article 15 applies to family farms, it could
presumably be applied to all farms. That is, there might be a particular inheritance regime
that favors farming generally due to the economic, family or social considerations of the
forum. Of course, article 18 might apply as well in this case on the theory that American
ownership of farmland is a manifest public policy. The example of farmland applies as well to
family-owned businesses, and could readily be extended to environmentally sensitive real
property, water and mineral rights, and any number of other assets. However, some "special
order of inheritance" would be required. Id. This might permit and encourage states, the
political subdivision at which succession law is enacted, to pass legislation exempting, for
example, much if not all of certain major categories of assets of their citizenry from the
Convention pursuant to some "special order."
273. See Report, supra note 13, cl.
110, at 587. More generally, should the United States be
party to a Convention that permits itself to be overridden in furtherance of the bias-laden
inheritance policies of various signatories to the Convention? Why should article 15 protect
gender, race or religious bias imposed by some other signatory state, but not testamentary
freedom in the United States? Put another way, could article 15 be read as excusing an
American forum from enforcing foreign forced heirship rights of children based on the theory
that economic, social and family considerations in the United States support a different, freer,
more capital-attracting inheritance regime in this country? Note that the Report itself
sanctions gender-based discriminatory inheritance. See supra note 266.
274. See Report, supra note 13, cl.110, at 587-89. This exemption based on a concern for
fractionalization could be read as applying to virtually any foreign pattern of succession
differing from standard American patterns.
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CONCLUSION

A. A Technical Solution
The Convention itself holds the seeds for a technical solution that
addresses the concerns raised in this Article, without preventing the
United States from ratifying the Convention. While this technical
solution should not be seen as an answer to the broader issues raised
in the Article, it is a useful approach that can also be pursued in connection with other private international law agreements that raise
similar federalism concerns. Pursuant to article 27 of the Convention,"' a country that has territorial units with different systems of
law is not required to have the Convention apply to all of its territorial units. This provision, intended for the benefit of Canada, 276 could
be resorted to by the United States, since Louisiana has a civil law
system, unlike the common law system in effect in the other states."
Under article 27, each territorial unit, that is, American state, would
be free to decide for itself whether to adopt the Convention. Article
27(1) simply would require the United States at the time of signature
or later ratification to signify that the Convention applies "only to one
or more" of its states. Furthermore, this declaration could be altered
from time to time.
Article 27 is not clear as to whether at least one state must have
declared its acceptance before the United States could signify its own
acceptance or ratification. Presumably, the United States could interpret the article as simply requiring a signatory country to notify the
275. Article 27 of the Convention, supra note 1, provides:
1 If a State has two or more territorial units in which different systems of law are
applicable in relation to matters dealt with in this Convention, it may at the
time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession declare that
this Convention shall extend to all of its territorial units or only to one or more
of them and may alter this declaration by submitting another declaration at
any time.
2 Any such declaration shall be notified to the depositary and shall state
expressly the territorial units to which the Convention applies.
3 If a State makes no declaration under this Article, the Convention is to extend
to all territorial units of that State.
276. See Report, supra note 13, cl. 149, at 615.
277. Technically, article 27 requires that the systems of law differ with respect to "matters
dealt with in this Convention." See supra note 276. Because an issue-by-issue analysis is
surely not intended, it must mean that in broad outline the succession laws must differ, even if
they have similar provisions. Inasmuch as Canada is given as an example of a country to
which article 27 might apply, see supra text accompanying note 277, the analogy between
Quebec and Louisiana would seem to support the article's application to the United States as
well.
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depositary country that it is invoking article 27. Admittedly, article
27(2) requires that a declaration by a signatory country state
expressly those "territorial units to which the Convention applies."
Initially, the United tates could declare that the Convention does not
yet apply to any states. As states enacted the provisions of the Convention, the United States could notify the depositary country, consistent with article 27(1). If a state rescinded or otherwise amended
Convention provisions, the depositary country could be notified that
one fewer territorial unit was subject to the Convention.
Moreover, even if articles 27 (1) and (2) do require at least one state
enactment before the United States can become a party to the Convention, this should not be regarded as a drawback. Until at least one
state is prepared to enact the Convention, the United States should
not ratify it, because the total absence of state approval indicates the
lack of any palpable public support. The fact that some time may
transpire before support for the Convention coalesces and manifests
itself in the form of state legislation should not be troubling. The
278
United States need not rush to ratify.

Approaching the Convention in this manner serves a number of
objectives. The traditional state autonomy in probate and choice of
law are preserved. More time for a careful analysis of the Convention
is obtained. The experience of the states initially adopting the Convention can be observed. Furthermore, state-by-state enactment replicates a familiar pattern of domestic law reform through uniform acts,
one that has been especially noteworthy in the probate field. 279 Those
states with more doubts about the Convention than other states will
not be subjected to legal and social structures especially detrimental
to their interests. As circumstances change, states can enter and exit
the fold-a wise approach in light of the Convention's deviation from
traditional rules as well as contemporary conflicts theory. Although
uniformity may suffer, it must be remembered that the Convention
itself, by way of article 27, does not expect such uniformity in federal
countries and recognizes that, in effect, the individual territorial units,
278. The example of other private law conventions is illuminating here. For instance, the
much less controversial Convention of October 26, 1973 Providing a Uniform Law on the
Form of an International Will was endorsed by the ABA Board of Governors in a Resolution
of April 12, 1980. It was finally ratified by the United States Senate on Aug. 8, 1991. See also
S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-9, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (July 30, 1991) (accompanying Treaty Doe. 9929). The text of this convention is reproduced in Kurt H. Nadelmann, The Formal Validity of
Wills and the Washington Convention 1973 Providing the Form of an International Will, 22
Am. J. Comp. L. 365, 379 (1974).
279. The prime example, of course, is the Uniform Probate Code.
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rather than the federation as a whole, can be the relevant sovereign
entities for purposes of ratification.
The Washington Convention of 1973 Providing a Uniform Law on
the Form of an International Will280 offers an appropriate model for
how reception of the Convention in this country ought to proceed. A
number of states, as well as the UPC,281 have incorporated its provisions into their laws. Although the Washington Convention itself had
not been ratified by the Senate until this year, this did not prevent
those states wishing to adopt its provisions from doing so. Article
XIV of that international agreement, like article 27 of the Convention, permits a federal country to leave it to its individual territorial
units to decide whether the Convention will apply in that unit. Moreover, despite ratification, each state retains its autonomy in deciding
whether to adopt the provisions of the Washington Convention.
B. The Convention and the Search for Uniformity in Choice of
Law

Apart from the technical solutions discussed, the Convention raises
very important questions about choice of law and succession to wealth
in a world in which wealth of individuals transcends political boundaries. The Convention places a premium on uniformity in choice of
law and the elimination of scission between real and personal property. This effort to resolve conflicts of laws by uniform choice of law
rules, however, has been shown to be a fruitless and deceptive exercise. The goal of uniformity, even if it were an admirable one, simply
leads to the question of what the uniform rule should be. Since conflicts scholars, courts, and different legal systems are in utter disagreement about the appropriate rules, whatever rules are adopted are
likely to carry little normative legitimacy and to be weighted down
with various, often illogical and impracticable exceptions. Moreover,
the idea of "rules" is itself vulnerable to attacks of process-oriented
conflicts theory, and if the focus is on process, there is no common
ground as to what that process should be.
Even if uniform rules could be agreed upon, their implementation
could only be achieved in the most formalistic and superficial manner.
The exceptions incorporated into the Convention, all standard confficts escape devices, such as the public policy exception, renvoi, and
the incidental question, afford significant leeway to the forum and
280. See supra note 278.
281. See, e.g., UPC. supra note 17, § 2-1001.
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assure that the reality of implementation will differ substantially from
the abstract statement of a rigid, rule-oriented system.
Suppose, however, that true and unswerving application of uniform
rules as to choice of law could be achieved throughout the world,
would the end result be the application of the chosen law? Almost
certainly, this would not be the case. The barrier that jurists from one
system or culture face when called upon to transmogrify themselves
into jurists or lawmakers of another system or culture cannot be
overcome.
Indeed, a strong dose of humility and doubt ought to accompany
any attempt at a "grand" solution to conflicts issues, especially in an
area such as succession, which is so uniquely associated with the
social, political, and economic structures of the various nations.
Development of an orderly, predictable system of wealth transfer
worldwide first requires a coalescence of views on substantive principles and underlying policies, not on the phantasm of an arbitrary and
easily-evaded system of rules. It nay also require regional solutions
or agreements, limited in application to countries with shared legal,
social, economic, and political structures.
The search for common ground on fundamental principles, such as
testamentary freedom or, perhaps, family protection is not an easy
one. It is likely to be a long and disappointing process. Still, if countries cannot agree on the basic premises of succession law, then it is
not especially in their interest to agree on a new system of choice of
law rules. Uniformity in choice of law makes a fine incantation, but
uniformity for uniformity's sake is a dangerous exercise when it fails
to take account of the internal, substantive law consequences of a system of international choice of law rules. Moreover, to the extent that
the objective in the realm of succession law should be predictability
rather than shared substantive norms, then simpler rules than those
proposed by the Convention are available. As long as each country's
rule is clear-cut, there is no need for uniformity.
Additionally, a uniform, international convention of choice of law
rules must come to grips with American constitutional and federalism
concerns. These concerns represent significant obstacles in terms of
substance and process. The concerns transcend succession law and
involve such disparate matters as the allocation of jurisdiction
between federal and state courts, the protection of individual rights,
and congressional bicameralism. 8 2
282. The author hopes to explore these issues in a subsequent Article.
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• This Article recognizes that international choice of law in the succession area cannot be divorced from interstate choice of law, despite
the Convention's attempt to do so. The effort to draw a totally effective and workable distinction in today's world of global investment
and travel between "interstate" and "international" succession matters is doomed to fail. Likewise, artificial lines drawn by the Convention between wealth passing by succession and by other modes,
between "succession" and administration, between validity of wills
and their construction, and between nontax and tax issues are arbitrary foundations on which to build a "uniform" system of choice of
law. They are entirely outmoded and theoretically unsound responses
to the realities of contemporary ownership and transfer of individual
wealth.
While there are certain differences in detail, all American states
agree on the preeminent goal of effectuating the wealth owner's plan
and assuring testamentary freedom with respect to the bulk of the
estate. This substantive uniformity should not be jeopardized as a
result of a quixotic search for worldwide uniformity in choice of law
rules.
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